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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two distinct lines of research efforts. Chap-
ter 2 proposes a general methodology to seek robust solution to multi-stage
stochastic optimization problems. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 all deal with models
that arise from inventory management and dynamic pricing.
Chapter 2 introduces the Extended Affinely Adjustable Robust Counter-
part(EAARC). We first propose the general steps of extending affine decision
rules via re-parameterizing the uncertainty set, then propose the example of
splitting-based EAARC. We show that this approach extends the versatility
of affine decision rules beyond what has been proposed by Ben-Tal et al. [9],
while retaining tractability.
Chapter 3 looks at the classical joint inventory-and-pricing model (single
product periodic-review) with concave ordering cost. Concave cost structures
may often occur in settings with multiple sources of supply. For this model,
assuming additive demand uncertainty, we show that a generalized (s, S, p)
policy is optimal under certain conditions imposed on the distribution of the
random perturbation.
Chapter 4 and 5 focus on the reference price effect in which the price impact
on demand is no longer instantaneous, but history-dependent. Chapter 4
analyzes a joint inventory-and-pricing model with reference price effect. We
prove that a reference price dependent base-stock policy is optimal even
though the single period expected profit may not be concave. In the infinite
horizon case, we further show that in the optimal trajectory, reference price
converges to a steady state and provide a characterization. Finally, chapter 5
studies a continuous-time dynamic pricing problem under stochastic reference
price effect. Stochastic optimal control theory is applied to the problem to
derive an explicit solution. Various comparative statics are then conducted
to benchmark our model against a few simplified models.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivations and Philosophy
The intention of this thesis is twofolds: to develop general methodologies for
multi-stage optimization problems under uncertainty; and to analyze specific
models that arise from an operations management context.
Chapter 2 describes the first line of our efforts. We look at optimiza-
tion problems under uncertainty, which means that certain parameters of
the problem formulation might not be known in exact value. In most situ-
ations, explicitly assuming uncertainty leads to more realistic models. Be-
cause uncertainties arise from nearly every step in the modeling process. As
an example, measurements from any physical process are subject to random
noise, hence the true value that they are trying to measure would always
be uncertain. Another example, the rainfall of a particular day in the fu-
ture is uncertain. The difference between this and the previous example
is that the true value for the rainfall will become revealed when that day
comes(ignorning uncertainties from measuring rainfall), whereas in the mea-
surement example, the true value will never be revealed. This difference will
be crucial in multi-stage problems.
There are two approaches to uncertainty in a model. The first approach
views any uncertain parameter as a random variable, with known probability
distribution. For example observations from physical processes are usually
assumed to be normally distributed, with some standard error implied by the
accuracy of the measuring tool. In this approach, the decision maker’s job is
then to make his decision (or decisions contingent to outcomes of some un-
certainties, if he is dealing with a multi-stage decision process) to maximize
his expected gain, or minimize his expected loss. Here the expectation is of
course taken over the random parameters. This approach, known as Stochas-
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tic Programming, has been a fruitful area of research. One can consult Birge
and Louveau [21] for an introductory treatment of the subject.
The second approach, to which our work belongs, takes a more conserva-
tive view of uncertainty. Namely it does not assume any known probability
distribution of the uncertain parameters. Rather, it only assume a range of
possible values for the uncertain parameter, usually in the form of an interval
centered around some nominal value. Given these assumptions the decision
maker’s task is to make a decision that optimizes his worst case outcome,
with respect to the ranged uncertainties. This approach is called Robust
Optimization, the word “robust” in its name naturally follows from the fact
that a decision maker is always trying to make a robust decision. The book
by Nemirovski et al. [7] is an excellent reference on the subject.
The previous discussion has alluded to the major difficulty of multi-stage
problems under uncertainty. When decision is made across time, those that
are made at a later time may benefit from some uncertainties being revealed
at that time (again, think of the rainfall example). Therefore decisions at
a later time should be contingent on uncertainties revealed to the decision
maker at that time. To be more precise, the decision maker would not be
choosing scalar quantities for his decision variables. He will be choosing
functions - functions of uncertainties that are realized before that decision
takes place (known as response functions). This exponentiates the complex-
ity of the decision process and, needless to say, is a daunting task. To regain
tractability, the approach generally taken is to assume that the response
functions take a certain form. Affin functions are common choices for this
purpose, because the task of choosing an affine function boils down to choos-
ing two quantities: the slope and the abscissas. Our approach takes one step
beyond affine functions, and propose methodologies that will provide more
versatile response functions, while retaining tractability.
Chapter 3 - 5 represent the second line of our efforts. In these chapters we
analyze models related to inventory management, dynamic pricing, and ref-
erence price effects. The main task of classical inventory management prob-
lems, is to make more informed inventory ordering decisions in the presense
of demand uncertainty, so that inventory cost is brought down, and drastic
overstocks or understocks are avoided. On the contrary, dynamic pricing
problems focus on the revenue side of profit. Dynamic pricing problems usu-
ally work around an established model for the price impact on demand. It
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then develops an optimal way to set different prices for a product across time,
and across consumer segments. This would ensure that the firm’s revenue is
maximized.
The pair of problems described above both serve the purpose of increasing
a firm’s bottomline - one through the cost side and one through the rev-
enue side. Traditionally, these two decisions are made separately. Marketing
decision is made first, and then a rough sales target is formed. Inventory
decisions are then made contingent on that sales target.
Recently there has been an increasing amount of work that tries to make
an integrated decision. The benefit of an integrated decision is obvious: it
is always better than two separate decisions, as it takes both sides into ac-
count simultaneously. This is especially important in the recent few decades,
when electronic-based retailing has devoured much of the traditional brick-
and-mortar stores, so that the complexities in product line, consumer de-
mographics, supply chain structure have all grown drastically. With such a
clear need for an integrated inventory-and-pricing decision process, there is
of course the cost: additional complexity in the models makes them harder
and harder to solve. That is why there is now a considerable amount of effort
in the research community seeking to find theoretically guaranteed structures
in optimal solution to these problems, so that the search for an optimal solu-
tion can be conducted on a smaller space, with complexity greatly reduced.
Chapter 3 of this thesis belongs to this stream of theoretical analysis. It
builds upon previously established results and generalize them to models
with more general cost structure. Literature review on those previous results
will be included in the next section and in later chapters.
Lastly, Chapter 4 and 5 focuses on what’s called the reference price effect
which was observed through empirical research in marketing science. The
effect, which will be defined more precisely in chapter 4, is roughly as fol-
lows: When consumers make their purchasing decision of a product, they
observe the current selling price, but they are usually aware of historical
prices charged on this product. Therefore they are very likely to form their
reference price based on those historical prices, and this reference price would
in turn influence their purchasing decision at the present time. The impli-
cation of this effect is that, when a firm sets its price for its products, the
price not only has impact on current demand, but also on future demands.
Thus to make the optimal dynamic pricing decisions, the firm must balance
3
instantaneous effects with future consequences.
To understand the implications of this effect on dynamic pricing decisions,
chapter 4 analyzes a joint inventory-and-pricing model with reference price
effects. Chapter 5 looks at the effect with slightly more scrutiny: refer-
ence price is formed by consumers’ sentiments of historical prices, which is a
very subjective process. Therefore it should be natural to assume that the
evolution process of reference price is subject to randomness. By explicitly
modeling reference price as a stochastic process, chapter 5 aims at charac-
terizing the impact of this additional randomness on the optimal decision
process, and tries to arrive at a more realistic and trustworthy model.
1.2 Literature Review
Detailed literature review will be provided at the beginning of each chapter.
This section only describes in broad strokes some of the theories/methods
that are already in existant in the literature, and are closely related to this
thesis.
The book by Nemirovski et al. [7] contains most of the recent develop-
ments in robust optimization, together with some illustrative examples. The
methodology that we will describe in chapter 2 is closely related to the paper
by Ben-Tal et al. [9]. To deal with the explosive complexity in a multi-stage
robust optimization problem, Ben-Tal et al. [9] develops the Affinely Ad-
justable Robust Counterpart(AARC). In chapter 2 we will extended their
idea to include some non-affine response functions.
There is a vast pool of literature on the topic of joint inventory-and-pricing
models, which we will analyze in chapters 3 and 4. One can consult Chen and
Simchi-Levi [28] for a comprehensive review of this area. Some other excellent
resources include Elmaghraby and Keskinocak [34], Federgruen and Heching
[35] and Yano and Gilbert [59].
As for the topic of reference price effect, the majority of the literature
belongs to marketing science. Mazumdar et al. [46] gives a good review of
the many statistical models proposed for reference price effect. There are
a few seminal papers trying to solve the problem of dynamic pricing in the
presence of reference price effect. We will defer the introduction of those
works until chapter 4.
4
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 2 introduces our methodology to multi-stage robust optimization
problems - the EAARC. Section 2.2 illustrates the limitation of the AARC
and introduce the EAARC. Section 2.3 presents constraint reformulation of
EAARC. Then section 2.4 describes a particular scheme of EAARC - the
splitting based EAARC and identifies conditions under which the splitting
based EAARC improves upon the AARC. Numerical experiments are de-
scribed in section 2.5 and concluding remarks are given in section 2.6.
Chapter 3 describes our theoretical work on joint inventory-and-pricing
models with general concave cost. Section 3.2 presents our main theoretical
results with its proof included in Appendix A. Section 3.3 then applies the
theoretical results to the joint inventory-and pricing model.
Chapter 4 analyzes the joint inventory-and-pricing model with reference
price effects. Specifically section 4.2 presents the model for a finite horizon,
and proves optimality of the base-stock policy. Section 4.3 then presents
the model for infinite horizon and proves convergence results. Section 4.4
provides characterization of steady states and finally section 4.5 makes con-
cluding remarks.
Chapter 5 studies the dynamic pricing problem with stochastic reference
price effects. Section 5.2 presents the model. The optimal pricing policy
is analyzed in section 5.3 and section 5.4 provides numerical experiments.
Conclusions for this chapter are given in section 5.6.
Finally, Chapter 6 points out some potential directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Uncertain Linear Programs: Extended Affinely
Adjustable Robust Counterparts
2.1 Introduction
Decision making under uncertainty is the key ingredient in many operations
research problems, for instance, supply chain management, revenue man-
agement and financial planning. One of the most important approaches for
optimization under uncertainty is stochastic programming, in which objec-
tives and constraints of optimization models are defined by averaging over
possible outcomes or considering probabilities of events of interest. Over the
past fifty years, a variety of stochastic programming theory and algorithms
have been developed and some successful stochastic programming applica-
tions have also been reported (see, e.g. Ruszczynski and Shapiro [51], Birge
and Louveau [21]).
However, despite its immense modeling potential, stochastic programming
faces two significant challenges. First, stochastic programs, especially multi-
stage problems, are notoriously difficult to solve to optimality and quite often,
even finding a feasible solution is already a hard problem. Second, stochas-
tic optimization problems require full distributional knowledge in each of
the uncertain data. Unfortunately, such information may rarely be available
in practice. The lack of tractable methodology and the full distributional
requirement have restricted the applicability of stochastic programming in
many practical settings.
To cope with some of the challenges faced by stochastic programming,
robust optimization received considerable attention in recent years as an al-
ternative approach to deal with optimization problems under uncertainty.
The first step in this direction was taken by Soyster [55] who proposed a
worst case model for linear optimization such that constraints are satisfied
under all possible perturbations of the uncertain data of the the underlying
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model. Recent developments in robust optimization focused on more elabo-
rate uncertainty sets of uncertain data in order to alleviate over-conservatism
in worst case models, as well as to maintain computational tractability of the
proposed approaches, (see, for example, Ben-Tal and Nemirovski [11, 12, 13],
El-Ghaoui and Lebret [32], El-Ghaoui et al. [33], Goldfarb and Iyengar [40],
Bertsimas and Sim [17, 18, 19, 20], Atamtu¨rk [3]).
Most of the research on robust optimization focuses on static settings, in
which all decisions must be made before the actual realization of the uncertain
data (referred to as the primitive uncertainties). To extend the robust opti-
mization methodology to dynamic settings, Ben-Tal et al. [9] proposed the
Adjustable Robust Counterpart (ARC), in which the primitive uncertainties
are assumed to vary within an uncertainty set while some decisions (recourse
variables) can be made after the realization of the primitive uncertainties
and be adjusted to its actual realization. A closely related approach was
proposed by Bertsimas and Caramanis [14]. In this approach, they intro-
duced the concept of finite adaptability, which is based on the selection of a
finite number of (constant) contingency plans to incorporate the information
revealed over time. Bertsimas and Caramanis [15] applied it to model the
air traffic control. On the other hand, under the adjustable robust counter-
part framework, Atamtu¨rk and Zhang [4] analyzed network design problems
under uncertainty.
Since the general adjustable robust counterpart is intractable, Ben-Tal et
al. [9] proposed a tractable approach for solving fixed recourse instances
using affine decision rules – restricting recourse variables as affine functions
of the realization of the primitive uncertainties, referred to as the Affinely
Adjustable Robust Counterpart (AARC). Even though the AARC has been
successfully applied to inventory management (Ben-Tal et al. [9]) and supply
contract problems (Ben-Tal et al. [8]), it is not surprising that the perfor-
mance of the AARC may not be satisfactory under situations in which the
recourse variables may exhibit high nonlinearity in terms of the primitive
uncertainties.
The goal of this chapter is to illustrate that the potential of the AARC
method is well beyond the one presented in Ben-Tal et al. [9]. Indeed, by
re-parameterizing the primitive uncertainties and then applying the AARC
method, we end up with a new model, which allows us to relax to certain
degree the linearity restriction imposed by the AARC. Specifically, in our
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approach, we re-parameterize the primitive uncertainties by introducing aux-
iliary variables and represent the recourse variables as affine functions of the
auxiliary variables. By using these auxiliary variables, the model can now
capture certain nonlinear response of the recourse variables to the primitive
uncertainties. In the sequel, we refer to the AARC as the AARC method
directly applied on the primitive uncertainties while the Extended Affinely
Adjustable Robust Counterpart (EAARC) as the AARC method applied to
the re-parameterized model.
Since the primitive uncertainties can be re-parameterized in a variety of
different ways, the EAARC is rather flexible and encompasses a broad class
of decision rules. We analyze a specific EAARC - the splitting based EAARC
in depth. In a simple setting, the splitting based EAARC essentially intro-
duces auxiliary variables to represent the positive and negative parts of the
primitive uncertainties. We demonstrate both theoretically and computa-
tionally that the splitting based EAARC may significantly improve upon the
AARC.
The idea of re-parameterizing the original problem before applying the
robust counterpart has been used in several papers for different purposes.
For instance, to avoid the over-conservatism incurred by working directly on
the primitive uncertainties, Ben-Tal et al. [10] re-parameterized the original
multi-period portfolio selection problem and then apply the robust counter-
part approach. In Ben-Tal et al. [6], the authors used a re-parametrization
scheme in a linear control problem to avoid a non-convex robust counterpart.
It is also common in the robust optimization literature, including Ben-Tal
et al. [9] and our work here, to re-parameterize the uncertainty data by a
vector of perturbations, referred to as the primitive uncertainties, varying in
a nonempty convex compact perturbation set. Indeed, the AARC in Ben-Tal
et al. [9] first applies the affine decision rule on the uncertain data, which are
then re-parameterized in terms of the primitive uncertainties, while here we
first re-parameterize the primitive uncertainties and then apply the AARC,
which interestingly results in a more flexible AARC.
Our splitting based EAARC approach bears some similarity with the ap-
proach suggested by Chen et al. [24] and Chen et al. [25]. Specifically, both
approaches are built upon the splitting of the primitive uncertainties to their
negative parts and positive parts. In addition, the segregated linear decision
rule proposed in [25] also represents the recourse response as affine functions
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of these negative parts and positive parts. Moreover, both approaches end
up with second order conic programming problems.
However, the models analyzed in [24] and [25] are fundamentally different
from the one proposed here. Indeed, [24] and [25] started with a (chance-
constrained) stochastic program and proposed tractable (convex) approxima-
tions to the stochastic program, while here we start with an ARC and use the
EAARC to approximate the ARC. Therefore, in this chapter, the primitive
uncertainties are restricted to an uncertainty set and thus is non-stochastic,
while in [24] and [25], the primitive uncertainties are stochastic with possibly
known mean, support, and some deviation measures, which require totally
different techniques for the analysis. Finally, even though both approaches
end up with second order conic programming problems, the formulations are
different.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we illustrate
the limitation of the AARC and introduce the EAARC. In Section 2.3, we
present equivalent formulations for constraints derived from the EAARC. In
Section 2.4, we introduce and analyze the splitting based EAARC and iden-
tify conditions under which the splitting based EAARC improves upon the
AARC. We then conduct numerical experiments to demonstrate the advan-
tage of the splitting based EAARC over the AARC in Section 2.5. Finally,
we provide some concluding remarks in Section 2.6.
2.2 Extended Affinely Adjustable Robust Counterpart
Consider the following two-stage uncertain linear programming problem 1:
min c′x
s.t. Ax+By ≤ b,
where c ∈ Rn, A ∈ Rr×n, B ∈ Rr×m and b ∈ Rr are uncertain data, and
c′ denote the transpose of vector c. In this problem, decision variables are
classified into two groups. The first group, denoted by x, represents “here
and now” decisions, i.e., decisions made before the realization of uncertain
1The approach presented here can be straightforwardly extended to multi-stage uncer-
tain linear programming problems.
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data (c,A,B, b). The second group, denoted by y, represents “wait and see”
decisions, i.e., decisions that can be adjusted to the realization of uncertainty.
A framework for modeling the two-stage uncertain linear programs is two-
stage stochastic programming. In such a framework, some stochastic struc-
ture is imposed on the uncertain data (c,A,B, b) and the objective is to
minimize the expected cost such that the constraints are satisfied with high
probability. Unfortunately, multi-stage stochastic programs are generally
hard to solve to optimality. To make things worse, specifying the stochastic
structure of the uncertain data may not be realistic in practice.
An alternative approach for modeling two-stage uncertain linear programs
is the adjustable robust counterpart first introduced by Ben-Tal et al. [9].
In an ARC, the constraints are satisfied for all the uncertain data varying
in a given uncertainty set, while the second stage decisions can be tuned to
the realization of the uncertain data. Specifically, the two-stage ARC for the
uncertain linear program can be written as follows.
min c′x
s.t. ∀(A,B, b) ∈ U ∃y Ax+By ≤ b,
(2.1)
where U is the uncertainty set. Here without loss of generality, we assume
that the cost coefficient vector c is fixed.
If B is fixed in (2.1), then the above formulation defines the ARC to an
uncertain linear program with fixed recourse. From now on, we focus on
uncertain linear programs with fixed recourse. In particular, we assume that
B is fixed and the uncertainty set can be parameterized affinely in terms of
the primitive uncertainties z ∈ RN .
U =
{
(A, b) : ∃z ∈ Γ, (A, b) = (A0, b0) +
N∑
j=1
(∆Aj,∆bj)zj
}
,
where (Aj, bj) ∈ Rr×n×Rr, j = 0, 1, . . . , N , are given, and Γ is a nonempty
closed convex subset in RN . Notice that since B is fixed, we remove B from
the representation of the uncertainty set.
Define m0(x) = A0x− b0. For a given x, let M (x) be a matrix in Rr×N
with the jth column given by ∆Ajx − ∆bj. The feasible set of the first
stage decision in problem (2.1) can be written as
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X0 =
{
x : ∀z ∈ Γ,∃y,m0(x) +M (x)z +By ≤ 0 } .
In general, the ARC problem (2.1) is intractable (See Ben-Tal et al. [9]).
To overcome this difficulty, Ben-Tal et al. [9] proposed the affinely adjustable
robust counterpart (AARC) assuming that the “wait and see” (or recourse)
variables are affinely dependent on the primitive uncertainties. That is,
y = y0 +
N∑
j=1
yjzj,
which will render the problem tractable. In this case, the feasible set X0
is approximated by
XAARC =
{
x : ∃y0,yj,m0(x) +M(x)z +By0 +
N∑
j=1
Byjzj ≤ 0 ∀z ∈ Γ
}
.
It is clear that XAARC ⊆ X0.
The AARC is motivated by the belief that the change in recourse variables
is often linear to small changes in data uncertainty. However, the AARC may
be too restrictive, particularly in cases where linear dependency fails to be a
good approximation, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 2.2.1. Consider the following ARC.
min x
∀‖z‖1 ≤ 1∃ y s.t. −yi ≤ zi,−yi ≤ −zi, i = 1, . . . , N∑N
i=1 yi ≤ x.
The example implies that |zi| ≤ yi and hence x ≥
∑N
i=1 yi ≥ ‖z‖1. There-
fore, the optimal objective value of the ARC is 1.
If we employ the linear decision rule y = y0 +
∑N
j=1 y
jzj, then the AARC
is as follows.
min x
s.t. −(y0i +
∑N
j=1 y
j
i zj) ≤ zi,
−(y0i +
∑N
j=1 y
j
i zj) ≤ −zi, i = 1, . . . , N, ∀‖z‖1 ≤ 1∑N
i=1(y
0
i +
∑N
j=1 y
j
i zj) ≤ x.
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The first two constraints imply that |zi| ≤ y0i +
∑N
j=1 y
j
i zj for all ‖z‖1 ≤ 1.
In particular, it is true for z = ±ei where ei is the unit vector with 1 at its
ith component. Therefore,
1 ≤ y0i + yii, 1 ≤ y0i − yii,
which implies that y0i ≥ 1. In addition, if we let z = 0, the last constraint
then implies that x ≥ N . Finally, if yj = 0 for j = 1, . . . , N and y0 = e
where e is the all ones vector, then we know the optimal objective value of
the AARC is N .
The purpose of this chapter is to relax the restriction of the AARC pro-
posed in Ben-Tal et al. [9], in which the recourse variables depend on the
primitive uncertainties in an affine manner. Specifically, we introduce auxil-
iary variables u ∈ RK for some dimension K, such that the recourse variables
can be represented as affine functions of the auxiliary variables u in addition
to the primitive uncertainties z.
y = y0 +
N∑
j=1
yjzj +
N+K∑
j=N+1
yjuj, (2.2)
where (z, u) ∈ Λ, uj is the jth component of u and Λ, referred to as the
extended uncertainty set, is a nonempty closed convex set in RN+K to be
specified later.
We now provide some motivation for using the above formulation (2.2). As
we illustrated in Example 2.2.1, it may be too restrictive in certain settings
to require the recourse variables to be affine functions of the realization of the
primitive uncertainties. By introducing the new variables u, we hope that
they would capture certain nonlinearity of the response functions. Ideally, it
would be nice to represent u as some nonlinear functions of z, say piecewise
linear functions of z, which, however, usually leads to intractable formula-
tions. Thus, instead of representing u directly as some nonlinear functions
of z, we impose the constraint (z, u) ∈ Λ.
Letting y take the form in (2.2), we can write down an approximation to
problem (2.1) as follows.
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min c′x
s.t. ∃y0,yj : m0(x) +M (x)z +By0 +∑Kj=1Byjzj +∑N+Kj=N+1Byjuj
≤ 0 ∀(z, u) ∈ Λ.
(2.3)
We call the problem the extended affinely adjustable robust counterpart. In
this problem, the feasible set of the first stage decision is
XEAARC :=
{
x : ∃y0,yj,m0(x) +M (x)z +By0 +
K∑
j=1
Byjzj
+
N+K∑
j=N+1
Byjuj ≤ 0 ∀(z, u) ∈ Λ
}
,
which can be considered as an approximation of the feasible set X0. When
necessary, we will also use XEAARC(Λ) to emphasize the extended uncertainty
set Λ.
It is straightforward to show that if Γ ⊆ Projz(Λ), where Projz(Λ) is the
projection of Λ into the z space, then XEAARC ⊆ X0.
As there are many different ways of choosing the extended uncertainty set
Λ, the EAARC is rather flexible. For instance, the AARC is a special case
of the EAARC. On the other hand, if the uncertainty set Γ itself is defined
through some auxiliary variables, then there is a natural way of defining
the extended uncertainty set Λ. Specifically, consider the uncertainty set
analyzed in Ben-Tal et al. [9]:
Γ = {z : ∃U : Zz +Uu K d},
where K is a nonempty convex cone and x  y if and only if y − x ∈ K.
In this case, it is natural to define
Λ = {(z,u) : Zz +Uu K d}.
Finally, if we choose Λ appropriately, XEAARC may recover the feasible
set X0. Indeed, assume that the set Γ is a polytope with extreme points,
z1, . . . ,zM . That is,
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Γ =
{
z : z =
M∑
j=1
zjuj,
M∑
j=1
uj = 1, uj ≥ 0,∀j = 1, . . . ,M
}
. (2.4)
Choose K = M and let
Λ =
{
(z, u) : z =
M∑
j=1
zjuj,
M∑
j=1
uj = 1, uj ≥ 0,∀j = 1, . . . ,M
}
. (2.5)
In this case, we have
XEAARC =
{
x : ∃y0,yj,m0(x) +By0
+
M∑
j=1
(M(x)zj +Byj)uj ≤ 0 ∀e′u = 1,u ≥ 0
}
.
In this following, we show that XEAARC = X0.
Theorem 2.2.1. If Γ and Λ are given by (2.4) and (2.5) respectively, then
XEAARC = X0.
Proof. From the definition of Γ and Λ, we have Γ = Projz(Λ). Thus,
XEAARC ⊆ X0. It remains to show X0 ⊆ XEAARC .
Recall the definition ofX0 = {x : ∀z ∈ Γ,∃y,m0(x) +M(x)z +By ≤ 0 }.
Hence, for a given x ∈ X0, there exists yj such that
m0(x) +M(x)zj +Byj ≤ 0, ∀ j = 1, 2, . . . ,M,
which implies that
m0(x) +
M∑
j=1
(M (x)zj +Byj)uj ≤ 0, ∀e′u = 1,u ≥ 0.
Thus, x ∈ XEAARC and X0 ⊆ XEAARC .
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2.3 Constraint Reformulation
In the previous section, we show that the EAARC is rather flexible. In
fact, if we define the extended uncertainty set Λ using the extreme points of
the original uncertainty set Γ, we can recover the feasible set of the ARC.
Unfortunately, in general, for a polyhedral set defined by linear equalities
and inequalities, the number of extreme points is exponential in terms of
the number of constraints of the polyhedral set and we may end up with an
intractable formulation.
Since the EAARC is essentially the application of the AARC on a re-
parameterized model, all the theoretical results for the AARC method carry
over to the EAARC verbatim as long as the extended uncertainty set is
chosen appropriately. In the following, we present equivalent formulations
for the robust constraints when the extended uncertainty set Λ is defined as
follows:
Λ = {(z, u) : Zz + Uu ≤ d}.
Under this assumption and using the constraint reformulation result of
the AARC method (see Ben-Tal et al. [9] for more details), we have that
x ∈ XEAARC if and only if there existW ,y0,Y z ,Y u such that the following
linear inequalities hold.
m0(x) +By0 +Wd ≤ 0
WZ = M(x) +BY z
WU = BY u
W ≥ 0.
(2.6)
Thus, problem (2.2) can be equivalently reformulated as the following lin-
ear program.
min c′x
s.t. (2.6) holds.
If the set Λ has a polynomial size representation in terms of the input data,
then the above linear program and hence its associated EAARC is tractable.
In the remainder of this section, we derive the dual of the feasibility prob-
lem (2.6). This dual is useful when we compare the feasibility set based on
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the EAARC and the one based on the AARC for the extended uncertainty
sets proposed in the next section.
Lemma 2.3.1. The dual of problem (2.6) is given as follows:
min −〈m0(x),α〉 − 〈M(x),β〉
s.t. Zβ′ +Uγ ′ ≤ dα′
B′α = 0
B′β = 0
B′γ = 0
α ≥ 0,
(2.7)
where α ∈ Rr, β ∈ Rr×N and 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product (specifically,
〈M(x),β〉 = trace(M(x)′β) denotes the inner product of the two matrices).
In addition, x ∈ XEAARC if and only if the optimal value of (2.7) is 0.
Proof. Define the Lagrangian function of the feasibility problem (2.6):
L(y0,Y z ,W ,Y u,α,β,γ)
=〈−m0(x)−By0 −Wd,α〉+ 〈WZ −M(x)−BY z ,β〉
+ 〈WU −BY u,γ〉
=− 〈m0(x),α〉 − 〈M (x),β〉+ 〈W ,Zβ′ +Uγ′ − dα′〉
− 〈y0,B′α〉 − 〈Y z ,B′β〉 − 〈Y u,B′γ〉
Consider the dual function defined by
Q(α,β,γ) = max
W≥0,y0,Y z ,Y u
L(y0,Y z ,W ,Y u,α,β,γ).
The Lagrangian dual of the feasibility problem (2.6) is given as
min
α≥0,β,γ
Q(α,β,γ),
which is equivalent to (2.7). It is clear that the feasibility problem (2.6) is
feasible if and only if its dual has an optimal objective value zero.
The sets Γ and Λ can be extended to incorporate conic constraints. We
have a result parallel to Lemma 2.3.1. Since its proof is similar to the one
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for Lemma 2.3.1 and follows directly from the conic programming duality
theory, we omit its proof.
Lemma 2.3.2. Assume that
Λ = {(z, u) : Zz + Uu K d},
and there exists (z, u) such that d − Zz − Uu lies in the interior of K.
Then, x ∈ XEAARC if and only if 0 is the optimal value of the following
problem
min −〈m0(x),α〉 − 〈M(x),β〉
s.t. Zβ′ +Uγ ′ K dα′
B′α = 0
B′β = 0
B′γ = 0
α ≥ 0.
2.4 The Splitting Based EAARC
In this section, we propose one way of choosing the extended uncertainty
set Λ. To illustrate the basic idea, we consider a simple setting in which
the uncertainty set Γ is the intersection of a polyhedral set and a norm
constrained set, that is,
Γ = {z : Lz ≤ l} ∩ {z : ‖z‖ ≤ Ω}. (2.8)
for some norm ‖ · ‖. The idea is essentially to split z into two parts, which
can be thought of as the positive part and the negative part of z. Specifically,
we let u = (v′,w′)′ and z = v −w. That is, z is defined as the difference
of two auxiliary variables v and w, which represents the positive part and
the negative part of z respectively. The extended uncertainty set can be
naturally defined as
Λ = {(z,u) : Lz ≤ l} ∩ {(z,u) :
u = (v′,w′)′, z = v −w, ‖v +w‖ ≤ Ω,v ≥ 0,w ≥ 0}.
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Thus, instead of using affine decision rules in terms of z, we consider
decision rules that are affine in v and w (obviously the affine part in z is
automatically subsumed in this case), namely,
y = y0 +
N∑
j=1
(rjvj + s
jwj),
where y0, rj and sj are vectors to be determined. The resulting EAARC
is referred to as the splitting based EAARC.
We now apply the splitting based EAARC to Example 2.2.1 to illustrate
that the EAARC may significantly improve upon the AARC.
Example 2.4.1. Consider the adjustable robust counterpart presented in Ex-
ample 2.2.1. In the EAARC decision rule, we have z = v−w,v ≥ 0,w ≥ 0
and y = y0 +
∑N
j=1(r
jvj + s
jwj). Then the EAARC is defined as follows:
min x
s.t. −(y0i +
∑N
j=1(r
j
i vj + s
j
iwj)) ≤ vi − wi,
−(y0i +
∑N
j=1(r
j
i vj + s
j
iwj)) ≤ −(vi − wi), i = 1, . . . , N,
∀‖v +w‖1 ≤ 1,v ≥ 0,w ≥ 0∑N
i=1(y
0
i +
∑N
j=1(r
j
i vj + s
j
iwj)) ≤ x.
The first two constraints imply that
|vi − wi| ≤ y0i +
N∑
j=1
(rji vj + s
j
iwj).
It is clear that y =
∑N
j=1 e
j(vj + wj) satisfies the first two constraints.
Furthermore, in this case,
x ≥
N∑
i=1
(vi + wi) = ‖v +w‖1.
Hence the optimal objective value of the EAARC is 1. This is exactly the
optimal objective value of the ARC, while the optimal objective value of the
AARC is N .
Observe that in the above example, the optimal response function is yj(z) =
|zj|, which is nonlinear in z. By introducing the positive and negative parts
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of z, we are able to capture the nonlinearity in this specific example.
We now extend the splitting idea to more general uncertainty sets. Specif-
ically, we focus on the uncertainty set
Γ = {z : ∃((u1)′, . . . , (uτ )′)′ ∈ RK1 × . . .RKτ Zz +
τ∑
t=1
U tut ≤ d,
‖z‖(0) ≤ Ω0, ‖ut‖(t) ≤ Ωt, t = 1, . . . , τ},
where d ∈ R`, Z ∈ R`×N and U t ∈ R`×Kt . Here ‖ · ‖(t), t = 0, 1, . . . , τ are
vector norms. In this chapter, all the vector norms ‖ · ‖(t) in the uncertainty
set satisfy the following condition:
‖ut‖(t) = ‖|ut|‖(t),
where |ut| is the vector with the jth component equal to |uj| ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
For technical reasons, we assume that the Slater condition holds. That
is, there exists ut, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ , such that Zu0 +
∑τ
t=1U
tut ≤ d with
‖ut‖(t) < Ωt if ‖ · ‖(t) is not a polyhedral norm. This assumption would allow
us to employ Lemma 2.3.2 in the following analysis.
The representation of our uncertainty set is broad enough to include many
uncertainty sets commonly used in the robust optimization literature. Ob-
viously, the uncertainty set (2.8) is a special case. More importantly, it also
includes the intersection of several general ellipsoids as a special case.
We now propose a specific extended uncertainty set Λ by splitting (z,u)
into its positive and negative parts. Specifically, let v = ((v0)′, . . . , (vτ )′)′ ∈
RK0 × . . .RKτ , w = ((w0)′, . . . , (wτ )′)′ ∈ RK0 × . . .RKτ with K0 = N and
define the extended uncertainty set as follows.
Λ = {(z,v,w) : Zz +
τ∑
t=1
U t(vt −wt) ≤ d, z = v0 −w0,
vt ≥ 0,wt ≥ 0, ‖vt +wt‖(t) ≤ Ωt, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ}. (2.9)
Now instead of using affine decision rules in terms of the primitive uncer-
tainties z, we represent the recourse decision y affinely in v and w (again
the affine part in z is automatically subsumed in this case), i.e.,
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y = y0 +
τ∑
t=0
Kt∑
i=1
(rt,ivti + s
t,iwti). (2.10)
We now formulate the EAARC as an equivalent conic programming prob-
lem, whose proof follows from Theorem 3.2 in Ben-Tal et al. [9] and thus is
omitted.
Theorem 2.4.1. The splitting based EAARC with the extended uncertainty
set (2.9) and the affine decision rule (2.10) is equivalent to the following
conic programming problem.
min c′x
s.t. m0(x) +By0 −Φd ≤ 0
(µt)′ ≥ Ωt‖(ht)′‖∗(t), t = 0, 1, . . . , τ
H0 ≥ Br0 + ΦZ +M (x)
H0 ≥ Bs0 −ΦZ −M(x)
H t ≥ Brt + ΦU t, t = 1, 2, . . . , τ
H t ≥ Bst −ΦU t, t = 1, 2, . . . , τ
H t ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ
Φ ≥ 0,
(2.11)
where Φ ∈ Rr×`, H t ∈ Rr×Kt and µt ∈ Rr. In addition, ‖(H t)′‖∗(t) is an
r-dimensional row vector with its jth entry equal to the conjugate norm of
‖ · ‖(t) taken over the jth row of H t.
Note that when all the vector norms ‖·‖(t) are 2-norms, the above problem
(2.11)) becomes a second order conic program.
We are interested in identifying conditions under which XEAARC(Λ) im-
proves upon XAARC when Λ is given in (2.9). However, rather than directly
comparing XEAARC(Λ) and XAARC , we will compare XEAARC(Λ) and another
extended uncertainty set XEAARC(Λ
0), where
Λ0 = {(z,u) : Zz +
τ∑
t=1
U tut ≤ d, ‖z‖(0) ≤ Ω0, ‖ut‖(t) ≤ Ωt, t = 1, 2, . . . , τ}
is the natural extension of the original uncertainty set.
Notice that Lemma 2.3.2 implies that x ∈ XEAARC(Λ0) if and only if 0 is
the optimal value of the following problem.
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min −〈m0(x),α〉 − 〈M(x),β〉
s.t. Zβ′ +
∑τ
t=1U
t(γt)′ ≤ dα′
B′α = 0
β = γ0
B′γt = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ
‖(γt)′‖(t) ≤ Ωtα′, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ
α ≥ 0.
(2.12)
Here α ∈ Rr, β ∈ Rr×N , γt ∈ Rr×Kt and ‖(γt)′‖(t) is an r dimensional
row vector with each entry equal to the norm of the corresponding column
in (γt)′.
Similarly, x ∈ XEAARC if and only if 0 is the optimal value of the following
problem.
min −〈m0(x),α〉 − 〈M(x),β〉
s.t. Zβ′ +
∑τ
t=1U
t(ηt − δt)′ ≤ dα′
B′α = 0
β = η0 − δ0
B′ηt = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ
B′δt = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ
‖(ηt)′ + (δt)′‖(t) ≤ Ωtα′, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ
α,ηt, δt ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ.
(2.13)
Here ηt, δt ∈ Rr×Kt .
It is straightforward to see that for any given feasible solution (α,β,η, δ)
of problem (2.13), (α,β,γ) with γ ′ = η′ − δ′ is feasible for problem (2.12).
If in addition, for any given feasible solution (α,β,γ) of problem (2.12),
we can find (η, δ) such that (α,β,η, δ) is feasible for problem (2.13), then
XEAARC(Λ) = XEAARC(Λ
0). However, if the projection of the feasible set
of problem (2.13) onto the (α,β) space is a true subset of the projection of
the feasible set of problem (2.12) onto the (α,β) space, then it is possible
that XEAARC(Λ
0) and thus XAARC are true subsets of XEAARC(Λ). In the
following we compare the two sets under several different cases. First, we
assume that Ωt is finite. The following theorem illustrates that when we
use the infinity norm in the uncertainty set, the EAARC with the extended
uncertainty set Λ does not improve upon the EAARC with the extended
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uncertainty set Λ0.
Theorem 2.4.2. If ‖ · ‖(t) = ‖ · ‖∞ and Ωt < ∞ for all t = 0, 1, . . . , τ ,
then the projection of the feasible set of problem (2.13) onto the (α,β) space
coincides with the projection of the feasible set of problem (2.12) onto the
(α,β) space. Thus, in this case, XEAARC(Λ) = XEAARC(Λ
0).
Proof. For any feasible solution (α,β,γ) of problem (2.12), we have that
‖(γt)′‖∞ ≤ Ωtα′. Define for t = 0, 1, . . . , τ ,
ηt =
1
2
(Ωteα
′ + γt)
and
δt =
1
2
(Ωteα
′ − γt).
It is straightforward to check that (α,β,η, δ) is feasible for problem (2.13)
and gives the same objective value. Thus, XEAARC(Λ) = XEAARC(Λ
0).
The above proof can be easily extended to the case in which Ωt = ∞ for
any t = 0, 1, . . . , τ .
Theorem 2.4.3. Assume Ωt = ∞ for all t = 0, 1, . . . , τ . If Λ0 is bounded,
then XEAARC(Λ) = XEAARC(Λ
0).
We now present an example to show that Theorem 2.4.3 may fail if Λ0 is
not bounded.
Example 2.4.2. Let r = N = 2, Λ0 = {(z1, z2, u1, u2) : z1 − z2 ≤ 1, z = u}
and
B =
[
1 1
1 1
]
.
In this case, it is clear that B′α = 0,α ≥ 0 implies that α = 0. Thus,
problem (2.13) has a unique solution (α,β,η, δ) = 0. However, in addition
to the feasible solution (α,β,γ) = 0, problem (2.12) has a nonzero feasible
solution (α,β,γ), in which α = 0, β = γ and
β =
[
1 1
−1 −1
]
.
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Therefore, the feasible set of problem (2.12) is a strict subset of the feasible
set of problem (2.13) and thus Theorem 2.4.3 does not hold.
We now show that Theorem 2.4.2 fails if the norm is different from the
infinity norm. For this purpose, we need the following result.
Lemma 2.4.1. Given a norm ‖ · ‖ with the property that ‖u‖ = ‖|u|‖ for
any u,
‖u‖ ≤ ‖v‖, ∀ 0 ≤ u ≤ v.
Proof. Let ei be the unit vector with its ith component being one. It suffices
to show that
‖u‖ ≤ ‖v‖,
for any u ≥ 0 and v = u+ γei for any i and γ ≥ 0.
Define a new vector vˆ such that
vˆ = u− (2ui + γ)ei.
It is clear that ‖vˆ‖ = ‖v‖. In addition, u lies within the line segment
between vˆ and v. Thus,
‖u‖ ≤ max{‖vˆ‖, ‖v‖} = ‖v‖.
In the following, we further assume that the vector norms ‖ · ‖(t) satisfies
the following conditions:
‖ei‖(t) = 1,∀i.
Theorem 2.4.4. If ‖ · ‖(t) 6= ‖ · ‖∞ and Ωt is finite for some t, then
XEAARC(Λ) may be a true subset of XEAARC(Λ
0). In this case, the EAARC
based on the extended uncertainty set Λ may provide a strict improvement
upon the AARC.
Proof. We prove this result by constructing an example. Specifically, we
construct an example in which for a feasible solution (α,β,γ) of problem
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(2.12), we cannot find (η, δ) such that (α,β,η, δ) is feasible for problem
(2.13). We consider the basic setting in which
Λ0 = {(z,u) : Lz ≤ l, z = u, ‖u‖ ≤ Ω}.
In this case, we have for a feasible solution (α,β,γ) of problem (2.12),
γ = β. Thus, it suffices to talk about the feasible solution (α,β) of problem
(2.12).
Let Ω = ‖[1 1]′‖. Choose B such that the null space of B′ is spanned by
α = [1 1 1 1 1]′, β1 and β2, where
β = [β1,β2] =

1 1
Ω 0
0 Ω
−Ω 0
0 −Ω
 .
It is easy to verify that (α,β) is feasible for problem (2.12). Now assume
that there exist η and δ such that (α,β,η, δ) is feasible for problem (2.13).
Since B′δ = 0, we have that
δj = ωjα+ µjβ
1 + νjβ
2, j = 1, 2,
for some scalars ωj, µj and νj. Since β
′ = η′−δ′, we have that η = [η1 η2]
with
η1 = ω1α+ (1 + µ1)β
1 + ν1β
2,
and
η2 = ω2α+ µ2β
1 + (1 + ν2)β
2.
Thus, the jth column of η′ + δ′ is given by[
2ω1 + 2µ1β
1
j + 2ν1β
2
j + β
1
j
2ω2 + 2µ2β
1
j + 2ν2β
2
j + β
1
j
]
.
Since ‖η′j + δ′j‖ ≤ Ωαj and δ ≥ 0, letting j = 1 implies that
ωj + µj + νj = 0, for j = 1, 2.
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Similarly, letting j = 2, 3 implies that
ω1 + Ωµ1 = 0, ω2 + Ων2 = 0.
The above equalities imply that
ω1 = −Ωµ1, ν1 = (Ω− 1)µ1,
and
ω2 = −Ων2, µ2 = (Ω− 1)ν2.
Letting j = 4, 5, η ≥ 0 implies that −µ1 ≥ 1/2 and −ν2 ≥ 1/2. In
addition, we have that∥∥∥∥∥
[
−4µ1Ω− Ω
−2Ω2ν2
]∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ Ω,
∥∥∥∥∥
[
−2Ω2µ1
−4ν2Ω− Ω
]∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ Ω (2.14)
However, −4µ1Ω − Ω ≥ Ω and −2Ω2ν2 ≥ Ω2. The above inequalities
together with Lemma 2.4.1 imply that ‖[1 Ω]′‖ ≤ 1. Hence, Ω = 1 and
‖[1 1]′‖ = 1. Again, this together with Lemma 2.4.1 implies that ‖(u1, u2)′‖ =
1 if and only if ‖(u1, u2)′‖ = ‖(u1, u2)′‖∞ for any u1 and u2.
In the construction of the uncertainty set of the EAARC, we essentially
split the primitive uncertainty z and the auxiliary variable u to the positive
parts and negative parts. We may generalize the idea by further splitting u
to more parts as follows.
Λ(K) = {(z,v,w) : Zz +
τ∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
U t(vt,k −wt,k) ≤ d,
z =
K∑
k=1
(v0,k −w0,k)} ∩
(
τ⋂
t=0
Gt(K)
)
where vt = [(vt,1)′ . . . (vt,K)′]′,wt = [(wt,1)′ . . . (wt,K)′]′ and for t = 0, 1, . . . , τ ,
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Gt(K) = {(z,v,w) : ‖
K∑
k=1
(vt,k +wt,k)‖(t) ≤ Ωt,
0 ≤ vt,k ≤ at,k,0 ≤ wt,k ≤ bt,k, k = 1, . . . , K}.
One may conjecture that by introducing more flexibility into the uncer-
tainty set, we can make further improvement. For a fair comparison, we
require that for t = 0, 1, . . . , τ ,
{ξ =
K∑
k=1
(vt,k −wt,k) : (z,v,w) ∈ Gt(K)} = {ξ : ‖ξ‖(t) ≤ Ωt}. (2.15)
Unfortunately, under these assumptions, Λ(K) may not provide any im-
provement over Λ(1). To see this, we consider the dual associated with the
uncertainty set Λ(K), which can be written as follows.
P (K) : min −〈m0(x),α〉 − 〈M(x),β〉
s.t. Zβ′ +
∑τ
t=1
∑K
k=1U
t(ηt,k − δt,k)′ ≤ dα′
B′α = 0
β =
∑K
k=1(η
0,k − δ0,k)
B′ηt,k = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ, k = 1, 2, . . . , K
B′δt,k = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ, k = 1, 2, . . . , K
‖∑Kk=1((ηt,k)′ + (δt,k)′)‖(t) ≤ Ωtα′, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ
0 ≤ ηt,k ≤ at,kα′, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ, k = 1, 2, . . . , K
0 ≤ δt,k ≤ bt,kα′, t = 0, 1, . . . , τ, k = 1, 2, . . . , K
α ≥ 0.
(2.16)
It is obvious that for any feasible solution of problem (2.16) for general
K, we can construct a feasible solution for problem (2.13) with the same
objective value.
On the other hand, since (2.15) holds, we claim that
K∑
k=1
at,k ≥ Ωte,
K∑
k=1
bt,k ≥ Ωte.
26
Indeed, since ‖Ωtei‖(t) = Ωt, there exist vt,k and wt,k such that
0 ≤ vt,k ≤ at,k,0 ≤ wt,k ≤ bt,k, ‖
K∑
k=1
(vt,k +wt,k)‖(t) ≤ Ωt,
and
∑K
t=1(v
t,k −wt,k) = Ωtei. Since vt,k,wt,k ≥ 0,
K∑
k=1
at,ki ≥
K∑
k=1
vt,ki ≥ Ωt.
Thus,
∑K
k=1 a
t,k ≥ Ωte. Similarly, we can show that
∑K
k=1 b
t,k ≥ Ωte. For
any feasible solution (α,β,η, δ) of problem (2.13), Lemma 2.4.1 implies that
0 ≤ (ηj)′ ≤ Ωα′,0 ≤ (δj)′ ≤ Ωα′.
Therefore, there exists ρik ≥ 0 and φik ≥ 0 such that
0 ≤ (ηt,ki )′ = ψt,ki (ηti)′ ≤ ψt,ki Ωtα′ ≤ at,ki α′,
K∑
k=1
ψt,ki = 1,
and
0 ≤ (δt,ki )′ = φt,ki (δti)′ ≤ φt,ki Ωtα′ ≤ bt,ki α′,
K∑
k=1
φt,ki = 1.
Hence, (α,β,η, δ) is feasible for problem (2.16) for general K, which im-
plies that further splitting (z,u) does not provide an improvement.
2.5 Numerical Experiment
In the previous section, we proposed one way of choosing the uncertainty
set in the EAARC and identified conditions under which the EAARC im-
proves upon the AARC. In this section, we conduct numerical experiments
to illustrate the improvement on a project management problem.
A project management problem can be represented by a directed graph
with m arcs and n nodes. Each node on the graph represents an event
marking the completion of a particular subset of activities. We denote the
set of directed arcs on the graph as E. Hence, an arc (i, j) ∈ E is an activity
that connects event i to event j. By convention, we use node 1 as the start
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event and the last node n as the end event.
We consider a project with several activities. The completion of activities
must satisfy precedent constraints. For example, activity e1 precedes activity
e2 if activity e1 must be completed before starting activity e2.
Each activity (i, j) ∈ E has an uncertain duration tij + zijij in which tij
and ij are constants, and zij ∈ [−1, 1] is the primitive uncertainty. The
value of zij is realized after event i is completed. But before this realization,
certain resources can be allocated to the activity to shorten its duration.
Specifically, we assume that if yij units of resource is allocated to activity
(i, j) ∈ E, then the duration of activity (i, j) would become tij + zijij − yij.
Let bij be the cost of using each unit of resource for the activity on the arc
(i, j). Our goal is to find a tradeoff of the completion time of the project and
the total cost of resource allocations.
Mathematically, our project management problem can be formulated as a
multi-stage uncertain linear program:
min
∑
ij
bijyij + Cxn
s.t. xj − xi + yij − zijij ≥ tij ∀(i, j) ∈ E
yij ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E
tij + zijij − yij ≥Mij ∀(i, j) ∈ E
x1 = 0
xn ≤ D

,∀ zij.
In this model, C is the per unit cost on the completion time, and xi
denotes the completion time of event i. The first constraint implies that the
completion time of event j is no less than the completion time of event i plus
the completion time of activity (i, j). The third constraint requires that the
reduction of the completion time of an activity cannot be arbitrarily large.
In particular, in our experiment, we assume that the minimum duration of
project (i, j) ∈ E must be at least Mij. We also require that the completion
time of the entire project meets a strict deadline D.
If the distributional information of the uncertain data is available, one
would formulate the problem as a multi-stage stochastic programming prob-
lem. Unfortunately, analysis of the project management problem within the
stochastic programming framework, such as determining the expected com-
pletion time and quantile of completion time, is notoriously difficult (see
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Hagstrom [42]). A tractable approximation is proposed in Chen et al. [24] to
a two-stage project management problem with uncertainty, which requires
mild distributional knowledge of the uncertain completion time tij.
In our experiment, instead of imposing distributional assumptions on the
uncertain data, we assume that the uncertain data are restricted within some
uncertainty set and formulate the project management problem within the
adjustable robust counterpart framework. Specifically, the uncertainty set Γ
is defined as follows:
Γ = {z = (zij)(i,j)∈E : −w¯ ≤ z ≤ v¯, ‖z‖2 ≤ Ω}.
We will compare the performance of the AARC and the splitting based
EAARC on the multi-stage project management problem. In the splitting
based EAARC, we define the uncertainty set Λ as follows:
Λ = {(z,v,w) = (zij, vij, wij)(i,j)∈E : z = v −w,
− w¯ ≤ v −w ≤ v¯, ‖v +w‖2 ≤ Ω, (v,w) ≥ 0}.
In addition, the decision variables xi and yij are represented as
xi = x
0
i +
∑
(k,l)∈Ii
xkl,vi vkl +
∑
(k,l)∈Ii
xkl,wi wkl,
yij = y
0
ij +
∑
(k,l)∈Ii
ykl,vij vkl +
∑
(k,l)∈Ii
ykl,wij wkl,
(2.17)
where vkl and wkl can be regarded as the positive part and negative part
of the primitive uncertainty zkl respectively. It is clear that when we impose
the constraints xkl,vi = −xkl,wi and ykl,vij = −ykl,wij , the EAARC reduces to the
AARC.
Note that in the above formulations, instead of summing (k, l) across all
arcs, we only take the summation in a selected set Ii. The set Ii is called
the information set for decision variable xi. By choosing the information
set properly, we ensure that at any stage of decision, the system only takes
into account information from previous realized uncertainties. Furthermore,
based on our assumption that resource on an arc is allocated before the
primitive uncertainty on that arc is realized, arc (i, j) should always have
the same information set as node i.
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Employing Theorem 2.4.1, the splitting based EAARC can be reformulated
as a second order conic program. However, it seems more convenient to carry
out the reformation using the following result which is shown in Chen et al.
[24].
Lemma 2.5.1. For a given scalar α and a vector a, the robust constraint
α + a′v + b′w ≤ 0, ∀(v,w) ∈ {(v,w) :
− w¯ ≤ v −w ≤ v¯, ‖v +w‖2 ≤ Ω, (v,w) ≥ 0}
can be equivalently written as
α + Ω‖u‖2 + r′v¯ + s′w¯ ≤ 0
uj ≥ aj − rj + sj,∀ j
uj ≥ bj + rj − sj,∀ j
u, r, s ≥ 0.
Since all the constraints in the EAARC have the same form as the robust
constraint in Lemma 2.5.1, they are referred to as robust constraints in the
sequel and we will use Lemma 2.5.1 to reformulate all the robust constraints
into their equivalent second order conic constraints. But before we do this,
note that any primitive uncertainty not in the information set should not
have an influence on the corresponding decision variable, therefore we have
the following constraints:
xkl,vi = x
kl,w
i = 0 ∀(k, l) /∈ Ii
ykl,vij = y
kl,w
ij = 0 ∀(k, l) /∈ Iij
Similarly the constraint x1 = 0 means x
kl,v
0 = x
kl,w
0 = 0 ∀(k, l).
The objective of minimizing
∑
ij
bijyij + Cxn can be written as minimizing
a new variable τ , subject to the robust constraint τ ≥∑
ij
bijyij +Cxn. Given
the representation of xi and yij in (2.17) and the extended uncertainty set
Λ, this robust constraint, together with the four other sets of robust con-
straints, is turned into their equivalent second order conic constraints. The
reformulations are presented below for convenience.
First set:
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τ ≥
∑
ij
bijyij + Cxn
becomes
τ ≥ Cx0n +
∑
(i,j)∈E
bijy
0
ij + Ω‖t‖2 +
∑
(k,l)∈E
(tklv v¯kl + t
kl
w w¯kl)
tkl ≥ ∑
(i,j)∈E
bijy
kl,v
ij + Cx
kl,v
n − tklv + tklw ∀(k, l) ∈ E
tkl ≥ ∑
(i,j)∈E
bijy
kl,w
ij + Cx
kl,w
n + t
kl
v − tklw ∀(k, l) ∈ E
t, tr, tw ≥ 0.
where t = (tkl)(k,l)∈E, tv = (tklv )(k,l)∈E and tw = (t
kl
w )(k,l)∈E.
Second set:
xj − xi + yij − zijij ≥ tij ∀(i, j) ∈ E
becomes
x0i − x0j − y0ij + tij + Ω‖γij‖2
+
∑
(k,l)∈E
(γklv,ij v¯kl + γ
kl
v,ijw¯kl) ≤ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E
γklij ≥ xkl,vi − xkl,vj − ykl,vij + εijδklij − γklv,ij + γklw,ij ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (k, l) ∈ E,
γklij ≥ xkl,wi − xkl,wj − ykl,wij − εijδklij + γklv,ij − γklw,ij ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (k, l) ∈ E
γij,γv,ij,γw,ij ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E,
where γij = (γ
kl
ij )(k,l)∈E, γv,ij = (γ
kl
v,ij)(k,l)∈E, γw,ij = (γ
kl
w,ij)(k,l)∈E, and
δklij = 1 if (i, j) = (k, l) and 0 otherwise.
Third set:
yij ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E
becomes
31
−y0ij + Ω‖αij‖2 +
∑
(k,l)∈E
(αklv,ij v¯kl + α
kl
w,ijw¯kl) ≤ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E
αklij ≥ −ykl,vij − αklv,ij + αklw,ij ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (k, l) ∈ E
αklij ≥ −ykl,wij + αklv,ij − αklw,ij ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (k, l) ∈ E
αij,αv,ij,αw,ij ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E,
where αij = (α
kl
ij )(k,l)∈E, αv,ij = (α
kl
v,ij)(k,l)∈E and αw,ij = (α
kl
w,ij)(k,l)∈E.
Fourth set:
tij + zijij − yij ≥Mij ∀(i, j) ∈ E
becomes
y0ij + Ω‖βij‖2 +
∑
(k,l)∈E
(βklv,ij v¯kl + β
kl
w,ijw¯kl)
≤ tij −Mij ∀(i, j) ∈ E
βklij ≥ ykl,vij − εijδklij − βklv,ij + βklw,ij ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (k, l) ∈ E
βklij ≥ ykl,wij + εijδklij + βklv,ij − βklw,ij ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (k, l) ∈ E
βij,βv,ij,βw,ij ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E,
where βij = (β
kl
ij )(k,l)∈E, βv,ij = (β
kl
v,ij)(k,l)∈E and βw,ij = (β
kl
w,ij)(k,l)∈E.
Fifth set:
xn ≤ D
becomes
x0n + Ω‖ψ‖2 +
∑
(k,l)∈E
(ψklv v¯kl + ψ
kl
s w¯kl) ≤ D
ψkl ≥ xkl,vn − ψklv + ψklw ∀(k, l) ∈ E
ψkl ≥ −xkl,wn + ψklv − ψklw ∀(k, l) ∈ E
ψ,ψv,ψw ≥ 0,
where ψ = (ψkl)(k,l)∈E,ψv = (ψ
kl
v )(k,l)∈E and ψw = (ψ
kl
w )(k,l)∈E.
Putting all the above together, we end up with a second order conic pro-
gram, for which we use CPLEX version 10 to solve. For our computational
experiment, we create a fictitious project with the activity network in the
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Figure 2.1: Project management grid with H = 3 and W = 5
form of a H by W grid (see Figure 2.1). There are a total of (H+1)×(W+1)
nodes, with the first node at the bottom left corner and the the last node at
the upper right corner. Each arc on the graph either points upwards or to
the right.
In an instance of the uncertain project management problem, the related
parameters tij,Mij, bij are generated randomly. Specifically, on horizontal
arcs, tij is generated from U [6, 10] (the uniform distribution in [6, 10]), the
minimum duration time Mij is generated from U [1, 5] and the resource unit
cost bij is generated from U [1, 10]. On the vertical arcs, tij is generated from
U [4, 6], Mij is generated from U [1, 3] and bij is generated from U [1, 5]. Let
ij = tij −Mij. We also fix C = 0.3 and let v¯ij = ρ+ and w¯ij = ρ− for some
positive constants ρ+ and ρ− (the exact values of ρ+ and ρ− will be specified
later). It is clear that ρ+ and ρ− measure the asymmetry of the primitive
uncertainties.
We use two difference criteria to compare the performance of the EAARC
and the AARC. In the first criterion, we measure the improvement of the
optimal objective value of the EAARC relative to the AARC. In the second
criterion, we compare the simulated average costs incurred using decision
rules (2.17) derived from the EAARC and the AARC. Here’s a precise de-
scription of how this is done:
• For an instance of the uncertain project management problem, we solve
the EAARC and AARC respectively to derive decision rules (2.17).
• Generate 100 samples of (zij)(i,j)∈E from U [−ρ−, ρ+] for the instance of
the uncertain project management problem.
• For each sample, compute the cost of the project management problem
when the decisions xi and yij are determined by the decision rules
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(2.17) derived from solving the EAARC and the AARC. The average
costs of the EAARC and the AARC are then defined as the average
of the corresponding costs of all samples. Since we assume that only
the primitive uncertainty z is observable, in the implementation of the
EAARC decision rule, we let vkl = max(zkl, 0) and wkl = max(−zkl, 0).
• Compute the percentage of improvement:
Percentage of Improvement =
(Average Cost of EAARC)− (Averaged Cost of AARC)
(Average Cost of AARC)
× 100%.
We now illustrate the impacts of the due date, the asymmetry property
of the primitive uncertainties, problem size, information set, and level of
robustness on the performance of the EAARC and the AARC.
Experiment 2.5.1 (Algorithm Improvement vs. due date constraint). We
use the 3 × 4 grid network. Let Ω = 3.0, ρ+ = 1 and ρ− = 0.7. We also
use the complete information set, i.e., for each event i, the information set
Ii consists of the realization of all past primitive uncertainties. We pick a
range of due dates D between 24 and 90. The percentage of improvement vs
due-date relation is shown in Figure 2.2.
Our experiment indicates that there is a lower bound l on the due date
(l = 24 in our example), below which the due-date constraint would become
so tight that both the EAARC and the AARC become infeasible. On the
other hand, when the due-date goes above an upper bound u (u = 85 in our
example), the time constraint becomes so loose that no project needs to be
shortened, and therefore, the EAARC and the AARC yield the same cost.
From Figure 2.2, we observe that the EAARC outperforms the AARC un-
der both criteria (simulated average or optimal value). We also observe that
the largest percentage of improvement always appears somewhere in the mid-
dle of l and u. While for due-dates near l or u, the costs derived from the
EAARC and the AARC are close. The explanation is as follows: when the
due-date is too loose or too tight, the problem becomes somewhat simplified,
i.e. all project must be shortened (in the tight case), or no project needs to
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Figure 2.2: Algorithm improvement vs. due-date
35
ρ− 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
Optimal 0.0% 2.3% 3.7% 4.5% 4.8% 4.9%
Simulated 0.0% 2.1% 2.9% 3.4% 3.5% 3.5%
ρ− 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
Optimal 4.6% 3.9% 2.9% 0.5% 0%
Simulated 3.3% 2.9% 2.3% 1.4% 0%
Table 2.1: Algorithm Improvement vs Asymmetric Uncertainty
be shortened (in the loose case). In either case, the EAARC does not have a
big advantage over the AARC.
Around the mid-point of l and u, however, it is not immediately clear which
project to shorten and how much to shorten. This adds more variability to
the problem, which would in turn demand additional flexibility in the response
function. The seemingly erratic shape in the middle portion suggests that the
percentage of improvement is sensitive to due date. Especially we observe that
there is a big jump at a due date around 71 in the graph. One possible inter-
pretation is that when the due date becomes rather loose, the optimal costs of
both EAARC and AARC decrease rapidly and thus their ratio as well as the
percentage of improvement becomes unstable. This is in fact a common ob-
servation throughout our experiments. We also observe that not surprisingly
the percentage of improvement under the two criteria demonstrates a certain
degree of correlation. The percentage of improvement under the simulated
average cost criterion, however, appears to be more volatile than the other.
Experiment 2.5.2 (Algorithm Improvement vs. Asymmetric Uncertainty
Set). As described before, our primitive uncertainty set can model asymmet-
ric uncertainties by adjusting ρ+ and ρ−. We are interested in comparing the
performances of the EAARC and the AARC under different levels of asym-
metry. Without loss of generality, we fix ρ+ to be 1 and let ρ− change. We
set D = 60 and still use the 3 × 4 grid network with Ω set to 3.0. The
computational results are shown in Table 2.1.
Surprisingly, when ρ− = 1 (completely symmetric uncertainty set), the
EAARC and the AARC always give the same cost in our experiment. On the
other end, when ρ− = 0, which means the uncertainty set lies completely in
the positive orthant, and therefore EAARC reduces to AARC (and gives 0%
improvement). When ρ− takes value in the middle range, under both criteria,
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Size 3× 4 4× 4 4× 5
Optimal 1.3% 2.4% 3.8%
Simulated 2.6% 3.5% 5.1%
Table 2.2: Algorithm Improvement vs Problem Size
the percentage of improvement gets higher. And peaks at around ρ− = 0.5.
Experiment 2.5.3 (Algorithm Improvement vs. Problem Size). We now
evaluate the algorithm improvement with different problem size. To do this,
three grid networks are selected with size 2×3, 3×3, 3×4, respectively. The
due dates are set to be 25, 30, 35, respectively. Again, let Ω = 3.0, ρ+ = 1
and ρ− = 0.7.
The percentage of improvements are listed in Table 2.2. From this table,
it is clear that the improvements in both the optimal objective values and the
simulation averages of using the EAARC grow when the problem size grows.
Interestingly, the improvement of the simulated average cost outperforms that
of the optimal objective value.
Experiment 2.5.4 (Algorithm Improvement vs. Information Set). This
experiment is carried out on a 3 × 4 grid network with Ω = 3.0, D = 60,
ρ+ = 1 and ρ− = 0.7. In the experiment, we compare the performance of
the EAARC and the AARC using the complete information set, in which all
the past information is available, and the partial information set, in which
information too distant away in the past is “lost”.
To be more precise, we define the degree of information availability L as
follows: for arc (i, j) to be in the information set for node k, activity (i, j)
must complete before event k and there is a path from event i to event k using
no more than L arcs. In our experiment, we vary L from 0 (information
become lost immediately, e.g., no information available) to 7 (for 3× 4 grid
this means no information are lost).
Results are listed in Table 2.3 (”INF” stands for infeasible).
As we can easily observe, the percentage of improvement doesn’t change
much when information set shrinks. The explanation is as follows: the de-
cision on a node depends heavily on the most “recent” information. Even
though we’re shrinking the information set, the most recent ones are still
kept. Therefore, the performance doesn’t change much. When L = 0, there
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D 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Optimal INF 3.1% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2%
Simulated INF 4.4% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 4.7%
Table 2.3: Algorithm Improvement vs Information Set
Ω 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Optimal 13.6% 8.1% 5.0% 3.2% 1.7%
Simulated 10.4% 6.3% 4.0% 4.5% 3.3%
Table 2.4: Algorithm Improvement vs Level of Robustness
are essentially no information available, and both the EAARC and the AARC
become infeasible easily.
To further justify our explanation, we’ve also tried information set that
includes all past information except the most recent ones. Both algorithms
become infeasible frequently under this information set. This further confirms
the intuition that for our project management problem, decision in each stage
relies mostly on recent information.
Experiment 2.5.5 (Algorithm Improvement vs. Level of Robustness(Ω)).
This experiment is conducted on the 3× 4 network with D = 60, ρ+ = 1 and
ρ− = 0.7. We vary the values for Ω to adjust the level of robustness, and
report the results in Table 2.4.
Clearly, the EAARC outperforms the AARC by larger percentages when Ω
is small. When Ω grows large, we essentially put more value on robustness:
both the EAARC and the AARC need to attain feasibility for a larger portion
of primitive uncertainties of the problem. In this situation, the flexibility of
the EAARC is confined, therefore the percentage of improvement decreases
as Ω grows.
In summary, the EAARC improves upon the AARC and its improvement
depends on the tightness of the due-date, the asymmetric property of the
uncertainty set, the information set, the size of the problem and the level
of robustness. Specifically, our experiment demonstrates that the EAARC
brings significant advantage over the AARC for due-dates that are not too
tight or too loose, information sets which include the most recent history,
larger problem size, and less stringent robustness. However, it is less clear
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how this improvement depends on the level of asymmetry of the uncertainty
sets.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose the extended affinely adjustable robust coun-
terpart to modeling and solving a class of multi-stage uncertain linear pro-
grams with fixed recourse. Our approach ends up with well structured conic
programming formulations, which are tractable and scalable to multi-stage
problems and allows for large scale implementation. We demonstrate both
theoretically and computationally that the splitting based extended affinely
adjustable robust counterpart may significantly improve upon the affinely
adjustable robust counterpart.
Our extended affinely adjustable robust counterpart is rather flexible. How-
ever, a significant challenge is how to choose an appropriate extended affinely
decision rule. Specifically, the following question is of great interest: for a
given constant ρ ≥ 1, can we construct a tractable EAARC such that
XEAARC ⊆ X0 ⊆ ρXEAARC?
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Chapter 3
Preservation of Quasi-K-Concavity and its
Application to Joint Inventory-Pricing Models
with Concave Ordering Costs
3.1 Introduction
The concept of quasi-K-concavity was introduced in Porteus [49] to prove
the optimality of a generalized (s, S) policy for inventory systems with con-
cave ordering costs. To apply this concept to characterize optimal inventory
policies, one relies heavily on some preservation properties under certain op-
timization operations. In this chapter, we provide a new preservation prop-
erty of quasi-K-concavity, which says that under mild technical conditions,
maxd[α(d) + β(y − d)] is quasi-K-concave if the one-dimensional functions
α(·) and β(·) are concave and quasi-K-concave respectively.
The preservation property plays a critical role in analyzing joint inventory-
pricing models with concave ordering costs. Specifically, consider a firm man-
aging an inventory system with concave ordering cost, which may arise when
the firm replenishes from a single supplier providing incremental quantity
discount or multiple suppliers with different fixed costs and variable costs.
Demand is random and depends on the selling price. Unsatisfied demand in
each period is fully backlogged. At the beginning of each period, the firm
makes pricing and inventory replenishment decisions simultaneously so as to
maximize the total expected discounted profit over a finite planning horizon.
For such a model, we show by employing the preservation property of quasi-
K-concavity that when demand is a deterministic function of the selling price
plus a random perturbation with a positive Po´lya or uniform distribution, the
value functions belong to the class of quasi-K-concave functions and therefore
a generalized (s, S, p) policy is optimal. Under such a policy, inventory is
managed based on a generalized (s, S) policy. That is, there is a sequence
of reorder points si and order-up-to levels Si (both are increasing in i) such
that if the starting inventory level is lower than the reorder point si but
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higher than si+1, the firm places an order to raise its inventory level to Si.
The optimal price is set according to the inventory level after replenishment.
For the special case with two suppliers, one with only variable cost while
the other with both fixed and variable costs, we prove that the generalized
(s, S, p) policy is still optimal when the additive random component in the
demand function has a strongly unimodal density.
Our model falls within the growing research stream on inventory and pric-
ing coordination. Recently, significant progress has been made on analyzing
integrated inventory and pricing models with fixed ordering cost and stochas-
tic demand for both backlog (see Chen and Simchi-Levi [26, 27]; Huh and
Janakiraman [43]) and lost sales (see Chen et al. [22]; Huh and Janakiraman
[43]; Song et al. [54]) cases. For a recent review of this literature, readers
are referred to Chen et al. [28]. However, we are not aware of any paper
analyzing inventory and pricing models with concave ordering cost, which
may be partly due to the technical complexity involved.
Our paper is closely related to classical stochastic inventory models with
general concave ordering costs analyzed in Porteus [50, 49], who introduced
the concept of quasi-K-concavity to prove the optimality of generalized (s, S)
inventory policies when demand is a positive Po´lya or uniform random vari-
able. Recently, Fox et al. [38] analyze a special case of Porteus’s model
with two suppliers, one with only variable cost while the other with both
fixed and variable costs. Using the concepts of K-concavity introduced in
Scarf [52] and quasi-concavity (equivalently, quasi-0-concavity), they prove
that the generalized (s, S) policy (indeed, a bit simplified policy) is optimal
when demand has a strongly unimodal density. Our results and analysis,
building upon the new preservation property of quasi-K-concavity as well as
preservation properties of K-concavity and quasi-concavity, extend those in
Porteus [50, 49] and Fox et al. [38] to include pricing decision.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present
our major technical results, which are then applied to characterize the opti-
mal policy for our inventory and pricing model with concave ordering cost in
Section 3.3.
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3.2 Main Technical Results
In this section, we present our preservation property of quasi-K-concavity.
Quasi-K-concavity was introduced by Porteus [50] to prove the optimality of
a generalized (s, S) policy for inventory systems with general concave order-
ing costs. By definition, a one-dimensional function f is quasi-K-concave if
for any x1 ≤ x2 and λ ∈ [0, 1], f((1− λ)x1 + λx2) ≥ min{f(x1), f(x2)−K}.
For brevity, readers are referred to Porteus [49] for properties of this class of
functions.
Among all quasi-K-concave functions, we mainly consider one class called
quasi-K-concave function with changeover a. A function f is quasi-K-concave
with changeover a if it is increasing on (−∞, a] and non-K-increasing on
[a,∞) (non-K-increasing means that for x1 < x2, f(x1) ≥ f(x2) −K). An
important property for this class of functions is that the quasi-K-concavity is
preserved under integral convolution with respect to a positive Po´lya or a pos-
itive uniform random variable. Positive Po´lya (also called one-sided Po´lya)
distribution includes, among others, all finite convolutions of exponentially
distributed random variables. Thus, as a special case, Erlang distribution
is positive Po´lya. Though the positive Po´lya distribution appears to be re-
strictive, Cox [29] notes that for any given µ and σ2 ∈ [µ2/n, µ2] for some
natural number n, a random variable with mean µ and variance σ2 can be
generated through a convolution of n exponential random variables. We re-
fer to Porteus [50] for more details on this class of random variables and its
relationship with quasi-K-concave functions.
We now present our major result of this section, which says that quasi-K-
concavity can be preserved under a maximization operation. Let α(·) and
β(·) be one-dimensional continuous functions defined in a bounded interval
D = [d, d¯] and in the real line respectively. Define a new function
Γ(y) = max
d∈D
[α(d) + β(y − d)]. (3.1)
Lemma 3.2.1. If α(·) is a differentiable concave function and β(·) is a con-
tinuously differentiable quasi-K-concave function with some finite changeover
ξ0. Then the function Γ(·) defined in problem (3.1) is quasi-K-concave with
a finite changeover no less than ξ0.
Since the proof is quite involved and long, it is provided in Appendix A.
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Here we only briefly sketch the main idea of the proof. First, we show that y−
d(y) is non-increasing in y, where d(y) is the smallest maximizer for problem
(3.1). Second, we show that d(y0) is a maximizer of function α(·), where y0
is the largest point such that Γ(·) is nondecreasing in (−∞, y0]. Third, we
show that y0 is no less than the largest changeover of β(·). Finally, we use
the results from the previous steps to prove that Γ(·) is non-K-increasing for
y ≥ y0 and thus is quasi-K-concave with y0 as its changeover.
In the next section, we will use Lemma 3.2.1 to analyze an inventory and
pricing model with concave ordering cost. For a special case of the model
involving two suppliers, one with only variable cost while the other with both
fixed and variable costs, we can prove that a generalized (s, S, p) policy is
optimal under a bit relaxed conditions using similar preservation properties
of quasi-concavity (equivalently, quasi-0-concavity) and K-concavity.
Lemma 3.2.2. Let α(·) and β(·) be two continuous functions and Γ(·) be
defined in problem (3.1). We have the following results:
(a) if α(·) and β(·) are both quasi-concave, Γ(·) is also quasi-concave;
(b) if α(·) is concave and β(·) is K-concave, Γ(·) is also K-concave.
Note that different from Lemma 3.2.1, part (a) of the above result only
requires the quasi-concavity of α. We also comment that K-concavity was
first introduced by Scarf [52] to show that an (s, S) policy is optimal for
stochastic inventory models with fixed ordering costs. Chen and Simchi-Levi
[26] implicitly use Theorem 3.2.2 part (b) to prove the optimality of (s, S, p)
policy for an inventory and pricing problem with fixed ordering cost and
additive demand.
3.3 Applications: Optimality of Generalized (s, S, p)
Policy
In this section, we show how to apply our preservation properties in the
previous section to analyze joint inventory and pricing models with concave
ordering costs. It is worthwhile mentioning that a similar approach can
be used to analyze another important application, namely inventory models
incorporating sales effort/promotion decisions and concave ordering costs.
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3.3.1 The Model
Consider a single product periodic-review inventory system in which a firm
needs to replenish its inventory and set the selling price simultaneously at
the beginning of each period over a finite planning horizon with length T .
Customer demand is random but depends on the price. Unsatisfied demand
is fully backlogged. The firm faces a concave piecewise linear ordering cost,
which can be viewed as ordering from different (say M) suppliers with differ-
ent fixed and variable ordering costs. Delivery leadtimes from all suppliers
are assumed to be zero, as is common in the literature of joint inventory and
pricing optimization. Ordering from supplier i incurs a fixed cost Ki and a
unit cost ci. Without loss of generality, assume that c1 > c2 > · · · > cM ≥ 0,
and 0 ≤ K1 < K2 < · · · < KM .
The remaining inventory at the end of each period t incurs a unit holding
cost ht while the unsatisfied demand incurs a unit backlog cost bt. We use
Lt(x) = ht max{x, 0} + bt max{−x, 0} to denote the inventory holding and
customer backlog cost given the ending inventory x. Let γ be the discount
factor, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Similar to Porteus [50] (Assumption B1 in Chapter 9.4),
we assume that (c1 − γcM) ≤ bt, which implies that it is more cost effective
to fill an order now from a more expensive supplier than delaying it until the
next period using a cheaper supplier (in terms of only variable cost). The
selling price of the product in period t is pt ∈ [pt, pt], and the demand has
the following additive form:
Dt(pt, t) = Dt(pt) + t,
in which t is a continuous random variable with cdf Ft(·) and mean µt.
We also make the following assumption on the function Dt(pt).
Assumption 3.3.1. For all t = 1, 2, · · · , T , Dt(p) has an inverse D−1t (d),
which is continuous and strictly decreasing. Furthermore, the expected rev-
enue
Rt(d) , (d+ µt)D−1t (d)
is differentiable and concave in d.
Assumption 1 implies that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the selling price pt ∈ [pt, p¯t] and dt = Dt(pt) ∈ Dt ≡ [dt, d¯t], where dt = Dt(p¯t)
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and d¯t = Dt(pt). Therefore, in what follows, to facilitate the analysis, we
will use d instead of p as the decision variable. The concavity requirement
for Rt(d) is standard in the literature. Demand functions that satisfy this
requirement include, among others, linear demand Dt(p) = a− bp and expo-
nential demand Dt(p) = ae
−bp.
We seek an optimal ordering and pricing policy for the firm so as to max-
imize its total expected discounted profit over the entire planning horizon.
Let vt(x) be the optimal total expected discounted profit from period t to T .
Note that vt(x) is a maximization over possible ordering from all M available
suppliers:
vt(x) = max
1≤i≤M
{
−ci(y − x) + sup
y≥x
[Hˆt(y)−Kiδ(y − x)]
}
where δ(q) = 1 if q > 0 and 0 otherwise, Hˆt is given as
Hˆt(y) = max
d∈Dt
{
Rt(d) + E[Gˆt(y − d− t)]
}
,
and Gˆt(x), including inventory holding and customer backlog cost as well
as the discounted profit from next period, is given by
Gˆt(x) = −Lt(x) + γvt+1(x).
To facilitate our analysis in the sequel, we define Git(x) = Gˆt(x) − cix,
Hit(y) = Hˆt(y) − ciy and Rˆit(d) = Rt(d) − cid. With these definitions, we
easily rewrite the above equations as:
vt(x) = max
1≤i≤M
{
cix+ sup
y≥x
[Hit(y)−Kiδ(y − x)]
}
(3.2)
Hit(y) = max
d∈Dt
{
Rˆit(d) + E[Git(y − d− t)]− ciµt
}
(3.3)
Git(x) = −cix− Lt(x) + γvt+1(x). (3.4)
We assume without loss of generality that vT+1(·) = 0. Note that lim|x|→∞Git(x) =
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lim
|x|→∞
Hit(y) = lim|x|→∞
vt(x) = −∞ as lim|x|→∞Lt(x) = +∞ and bt ≥ c1 − γcM .
We end this section with the definition of generalized (s, S) policy.
Definition 3.3.1. A policy pi is called generalized (s, S) if there exists an m
and a sequence of parameters
sm ≤ sm−1 ≤ · · · ≤ s1 ≤ S1 ≤ S2 ≤ · · · ≤ Sm,
such that, given starting inventory level x, the optimal order-up-to level
pi(x) is given by Sm if x < sm, Si if si+1 ≤ x < si for i = 1, 2, · · · ,m − 1,
and x otherwise.
3.3.2 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the optimization problem (3.2)-(3.4) and charac-
terize the optimal policies.
Let V ∗ denote the set of continuous functions v : R → R such that
−cMx + v(x) is non-decreasing on (−∞, 0] and that −cix + v(x) is non-Ki-
increasing for each i on R. The following result provides a characterization
of the optimal policy of problem (3.2)-(3.4).
Theorem 3.3.1. If vt+1 ∈ V ∗ and t is a positive Po´lya or a positive uniform
random variable, then
(a) Hit is quasi-Ki-concave with changeover at some ait ≥ 0 for each i;
(b) There exists a generalized (s, S, p) policy that is optimal in period t;
(c) vt ∈ V ∗.
Thus, for our joint inventory and pricing problem (3.2)-(3.4), a generalized
(s, S, p) policy is optimal.
Proof. For part (a), we first rewrite
Git(y) = −[(ci − γcM)y + Lt(y)] + γ[vt+1(y)− cMy].
The property of vt+1(y), together with the assumptions (c1 − γcM) ≤ bt
and ci < c1, implies that each term in Git(y) is increasing in (−∞, 0] and
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thus Git(y) is increasing in (−∞, 0]. Moreover, for y > 0, we rewrite Git(y)
as
Git(y) = −[(1− γ)ciy + Lt(y)[+γ[−ciy + vt+1(y)].
Because −[(1 − γ)ciy + Lt(y)[ is decreasing and hence non-(1 − γ)Ki-
increasing and γ[−ciy+vt+1(y)] is non-γKi-increasing as vt+1 ∈ V ∗, Git(y) is
non-Ki-increasing for y > 0. Thus, Git(y) is quasi-Ki-concave with changeover
0. Since t has positive Po´lya distribution, E[Git(y − d − t)] is quasi-Ki-
concave in y with a positive changeover. lim
|x|→∞
Git(x) = −∞ implies that
this changeover is finite. In addition, since t is a continuous random vari-
able, E[Git(y− d− t)] is continuously differentiable. Thus, by Lemma 3.2.1,
Hit(y) is quasi-Ki-concave with a changeover at some ait ≥ 0, and part (a)
is proven.
For part (b), since Hit(y) is quasi-Ki-concave, it is optimal to replenish
inventory following a generalized (s, S) policy, which follows directly from
Lemma 9.13 in Porteus [50]. Moreover, there exists an optimal d∗it(y), such
that
d∗it(y) = argmax
d∈[dt,dt]
{Rˆit(d) + E[Git(y − d− t)]}.
Note that the optimal d∗it(y) is set based on the resulting inventory level y
after the replenishment decision, and we can find the optimal price p∗ through
D−1t (d
∗
it(y)) = p
∗ given i is the supplier being ordered from.
For the proof of part (c), readers are referred to Porteus [49] pp. 147-148
for detailed steps.
We now focus on a special case of the model presented above. Specifically,
we assume that there are only two suppliers: supplier H and supplier L,
where supplierH charges a variable cost c1 per unit but no fixed cost (K1 = 0)
while supplier L charges a variable cost c2 (c1 > c2) per unit plus a fixed cost
K2 = K > 0. Such a cost structure is commonly seen in the practice of a
dual sourcing strategy as discussed in Fox et al. [38]. Similar to the general
model, we assume bt ≥ c1 − γc2.
Given this cost structure, Fox et al. [38] proved for a corresponding in-
ventory model without pricing decisions the optimality of generalized (s, S)
type policies when demand has strongly unimodal densities. The class of
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strongly unimodal density functions is a broader class of random variables
and includes many commonly used probability distributions such as normal,
uniform, gamma distribution with shape parameter p ≥ 1. A salient property
of strongly unimodal density functions is the preservation of quasi-concavity,
i.e., E[f(x − )] is still quasi-concave if f is and  has a strongly unimodal
density (for more discussion on strongly unimodal density functions see Dhar-
madhikari and Joag-Dev [31]).
The result in Fox et al. [38] can be extended to our setting with pricing
decisions. Specifically, the following result implies that the optimal inventory
policy is a hybrid version of a base-stock policy plus an (s, S) policy.
Theorem 3.3.2. For our joint inventory and pricing problem with two sup-
pliers, under Assumption 3.3.1 with t having a strongly unimodal density,
there exist parameters st, S
L
t , S
H
t for period t such that the optimal order-
up-to level y∗t takes one of the two forms: If S
H
t ≤ st, order from supplier L
based on the following (st, S
L
t ) policy,
y∗t =
{
SLt , if x ≤ st
xt, if x > st;
otherwise, follow an (st, S
H
t , S
L
t ) mixed-ordering policy,
y∗t =

SLt (order from supplier L) if x ≤ st
SHt (order from supplier H) if st < x ≤ SHt
x if x > SHt .
Finally, set the optimal price p∗ = D−1t (d
∗
t (y
∗
t )) based on the inventory level
after replenishment.
The proof of the above result is almost parallel to the one in Fox et al.
[38], who essentially show that both quasi-concavity and K-concavity can be
preserved under dynamic programming recursions. Thus, rather than pre-
senting the complete proof we will only sketch the key steps to prove the
preservation of quasi-concavity and K-concavity under dynamic program-
ming recursions (3.2)-(3.4) while highlighting the major differences with Fox
et al. [38]. The main idea of the proof is to show by induction that vt(x)
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is K-concave and G1t−1(x) is quasi-concave in two steps. In the first step,
one can prove that if H1t(y) is quasi-concave with nonnegative changeover
and H2t(y) is K-concave, then the policy described in Theorem 3.3.2 is opti-
mal, and in addition, vt(x) is K-concave and G1t−1(x) is quasi-concave with
nonnegative changeover. This step can be proven by following an argument
similar to the one in Fox et al. [38].
In the second step, we prove that if vt+1(x) is K-concave and G1t(x) is
quasi-concave with nonnegative changeover, then H1t(y) is quasi-concave
with nonnegative changeover and H2t(y) is K-concave. Observe that quasi-
concavity is preserved under integral convolution with a strongly unimodal
densities while K-concavity is preserved under integral convolution with gen-
eral densities. Thus, to complete the proof of the second step, it suffices to
use Lemma 3.2.2 to show that quasi-concavity and K-concavity are preserved
under the optimization operation (3.1), which constitutes the major differ-
ence between our proof and the one in Fox et al. [38].
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Chapter 4
Stochastic Inventory Model with Reference
Price Effects
4.1 Introduction
Joint inventory-and-pricing models have enjoyed a rapid growth in the re-
cent few decades. The driving force behind this development is quite clear:
it is a good attempt that brings together the focus of traditionally separated
disciplines. From an operations perspective which focuses on inventory con-
trol issues, bringing in pricing gives the decision maker an addition set of
tools to achieve profit maximization. On the other hand, from an economics
perspective which traditionally focuses on price and demand curve, inven-
tory control is a problem that’s often overlooked, but important enough that
practitioners are forced to analyze.
A first attempt to joint inventory-and-pricing models dates back to Whitin
[58], which analyzed a one-period model. Recently, significant progress has
been made in this area. With fixed ordering cost and stochastic demand,
Chen and Simchi-Levi [26][27] and Huh and Janakiraman [43] analyzed the
backlogging case. Lost sales case was dealt with in Chen et al. [22] and Huh
and Janakiraman [43]. For comprehensive reviews of this area see Chen and
Simchi-Levi [28], Elmaghraby and Keskinocak [34], Federgruen and Heching
[35] and Yano and Gilbert [59].
The demand function involved in most of the joint inventory-and-pricing
models are dependent on price only through an instantaneous effect, that
is, demand is assumed a function of the current price only. In recent years,
numerous empirical studies in marketing science which analyze comsumers’
choice behavior have revealed a more intricate relation between price and de-
mand. This lead to the notion of reference price effects. For a good review of
this area as well as an introduction to the conceptual framework, the readers
are referred to Mazumdar et al. [46]. In order to understand what reference
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price effect means, consider a customer who enters a shop. If he has previ-
ous shopping experience for a product, then he is likely to form an internal
judgement of a “fair price” for that product based on previous knowledge.
This perceived “fair price” is termed reference price. The customer would
then base his decision upon this reference price. When the observed price
is below it, the customer would see it as a bargain and would buy it with a
higher probability. On the other hand, when the observed price is above the
reference point, the customer would see it as a loss and would be less inclined
to make the purchase. In psychology, this reference-point-dependent behav-
ior has been well explained using prospect theory in Kahneman and Tversky
[44].
Since reference price cannot be directly observed through transaction records,
its exact nature has been under debate. Some argue that it should simply
reflect the memory for past prices; Others say that a reference price should
be an expected future price, which incorporates a subjective view of a ”fair
price” for the product. Again, for a comprehensive review of the conceptual
framework, see Mazumdar et al. [46]. This review paper also summarized
most statistical models that have been proposed for reference price. In our
study, we stick to the commonly-used assumption that reference price is de-
fined by an exponentially-weighted average of historical prices. Details of
this will be made clear when we discuss our model in the next section.
For any practitioner who is responsible for making pricing decisions, be-
ing aware of the reference price effect is of course beneficial as it leads to a
more accurate judgement on the demand he faces, and hence a more prof-
itable decision. Suppose a retailing firm has some knowledge of the reference
price effect among its customers, how would she dynamically set her price
in order to make the maximum profit out of this effect? It turns out that
there has already been some work along this direction. In Greenleaf [41], the
author analyzed the impact of reference price effect on a single-period pro-
motion. Specifically the author argued how the reference price effect would
create a trade-off between additional short-term profits and a better long-
term prospect. He then described how an optimal promotion strategy should
be designed in order to reap the most profit out of this effect. Also under
a discrete-time framework, Kopalle et al. [45] used dynamic programming
to study the optimal pricing policy under asymmetric reference price effect.
They further discussed a setting where brands compete in an oligopoly. Re-
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cently, using a more general demand function than previous works, Popescu
and Wu [48] provided analytical answers to several questions of interest.
Namely, they discussed conditions under which a constant pricing strategy
would be optimal. They also proved that in certain cases, given an arbi-
trary starting reference price, the system would converge to the constant
pricing strategy. Finally, In a continuous-time framework, Fibich et al. [36]
studied the dynamic pricing problem under both symmetric and asymmetric
demand function. Their work provided an elegant explicit solution to the
optimal price process using optimal control. Extension to oligopolistic con-
petition was also discussed for which the solution tool changed to dynamic
games.
What distinguishes our paper from this literature is that pricing with ref-
erence price effect and inventory decision are all integrated in one model.
This poses a significant challenge to analyzing the model and establishing
structural results. We are currently aware of only a few studies along this di-
rection: Urban [57] analyzed a one-period joint inventory-and-pricing model
with both symmetric and asymmetric reference price effect, and provided
numerical analysis which indicates that accounting for reference prices can
have a substantial impact on the firm’s profitability. In Gimpl-Heersink [39]
the author mainly analyzed the model for one-period and two-periods cases.
By explicitly calculating the profit-to-go function and its partial derivatives,
the author proved that a base-stock list-price policy is optimal for both the
two periods. They also provided a discussion on multi-period model however
the assumptions are relatively restrictive: the commonly-used linear demand
function - among other demand functions - fails to satisfy their assump-
tion. Chen et al. [23] analyzed the problem from an algorithmic perspective.
Namely they looked at an Economic-Lot-Sizing(ELS) problem with dynamic
pricing and with reference price effect. They developed strong polynomial
time algorithms for a few special cases of the prolem, and for the general
case, they provided a heuristic with error bound estimations. And finally, we
would like to mention the work by Ahn et al. [1]. They also studied an ELS
model with dynamic pricing in which demand can be a function of current
period price as well as past period prices. Although their demand model is
not of the reference price-type per se, it is closely related. In fact, one of their
special cases is almost identical to a special case in Chen et al. [23]. They
proved structural results for their model and developed closed-form solutions
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or heuristics for various special cases.
In our paper, we try to analyze the finite horizon as well as infinite horizon
version of the model, under various forms of demand function, reference
price effect, and demand uncertainty. We will first provide a transformation
technique that makes the new revenue function jointly concave under linear
demand function, thus addressing the difficulty raised in Gimpl-Heersink [39]
regarding linear demand functions. We will prove the optimality of a base-
stock policy. We will then prove that reference price will converge to some
steady state in the optimal trajectory. Finally we will give characterizations
to the steady states. The conditions under which these results are obtained
will be made clear in the sequel.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we present
the mathematical formulation of our model in finite horizon and discuss base-
stock policy. In Section 4.3 we move to the infinite horizon model and prove
the convergence results. Characterization of steady states are given in Sec-
tion 4.4, various comparative statics as well as economic intuitions are also
provided. Finally Section 4.5 concludes the paper and points to interesting
topics for future research.
4.2 Our Model
We describe the model in a finite horizon setting. The corresponding infinite
horizon model can be formulated in the same way. Consider a firm making
inventory and pricing decisions over a planning horizon of length T . Periods
are labeled backwards as T, · · · , 1 where T corresponds to the first period in
time. We also add an artificial period 0 to denote the end of the planning
horizon. At the beginning of each period, an ordering decision is made to-
gether with a pricing decision. The order is received immediately and incurs
a per unit cost c. Let P ≡ [p, p¯] be the interval of allowed prices, we also
assume that reference price r lies in P . Demand is stochastic and depends
on the current period price p as well as the reference price r. Specifically, we
have:
Assumption 4.2.1 (Stochastic Demand Function). Demand is given as:
Dt(pt, rt, ) = dt(pt, rt)m + a,
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dt(p, r) is the expected demand function and is assumed to be non-increasing
in p and nondecreasing in r.  = (m, a) is random with E[m] = 1 and
E[a] = 0. Furthermore, Dt(p, r, ) ≥ for any p, r ∈ P and any .
The following expected demand function dt(p, r) will be used in most of
our analysis. A more general form will be given and used in Section 4.4.
Definition 4.2.1 (Expected Demand Function). Expected demand is given
by dt(p, r) = bt − atp+Qt(r − p) and
Qt(x) = η
+(x)+ + η−(−x)+,
where x+ = max(0, x) and η+, η− ≥ 0. The demand is said to be:
• Loss-Averse(LA): if η+ < η−.
• Loss-Neutral(LN): if η+ = η−(also called Symmetric Reference Price
Effect).
• Loss-Seeking(LS): if η+ > η−.
The first term in the expected demand function (with a slight abuse of
notation we call it dt(p)) is the base demand function and Qt(r − p) is the
reference price effect. We defined Qt(x) to be a two-piece linear function,
with its only kink at x = 0. Note that r − p corresponds to consumers’
perceived loss/gain, with r− p < 0 being a loss. Among two cases of LA and
LS, Loss-Averse(LA) demand is more favored from a psychological point-
of-view using Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky [44]). Specifically
it predicts, as a general rule, that a perceived loss would stimulate more
reaction from a human, compared to a perceived gain. When the two slopes
are equal: η+ = η− , η, consumers have equal response to loss and gain.
That is why this is called Loss-Neutral(LN) demand, or symmetric reference
price effect. As pointed out in Fibich et al. [36], this “bears many similarities
to the model of symmetric sticky-price effects, i.e., when market price does
not adjust instantaneously to changes in quantities supplied.” In our analysis
we will try to establish our results using LN demand, and extend it to LA or
LS demand whenever possible.
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4.2.1 Model formulation
With the demand function, we can define expected revenue as Rˆt(p, r) =
E[(p− c)Dt(p, r, )] which equals (p− c)dt(p, r) by Assumption (4.2.1). Ref-
erence price evolves according to the following dynamics(remember periods
are labeled backwards):
rt−1 = (1− α)pt + αrt. (4.1)
We make a comment here that applies to the Bellman Equation which we are
about to describe. By default, price pt is used as the independent (decision)
variable in the Bellman Equation. However from (4.1), given rt, there is
a one-to-one correspondence between pt and rt−1. Therefore choosing pt
is equivalent to choosing rt−1, in their respective feasible region of course.
Thus, in some of our subsequent analysis we will use rt−1 instead of pt as the
decision variable.
We assume unsatisfied demand is backlogged and let h(x) be the inventory
holding and backlogging cost function. Denote by Πt(y, p, r) the single period
expected profit, i.e.,
Πt(y, p, r) = Rˆt(p, r)− E[hγ(y − dt(p, r, ))],
γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and hγ(x) = h(x) + (1 − γ)cx is a trans-
formed holding cost function. This transformation is a standard technique
on stochastic inventory problems. For more information on this one can see,
for example, Simchi-Levi et al. [53]. We further assume that hγ(x) is convex.
We are now ready to describe the finite horizon problem formulation. Let
φˆt(x, r) be the profit-to-go function at the end of period t with inventory x
and reference price r. For the end of the planning horizon let φˆ0(x, r) ≡ 0.
The Bellman equation for period t (t = 1, · · · , T ) is:
φˆt(x, r) = max
y≥x,p∈P
Πt(y, p, r) + γEφˆt−1[y − d(p, r, ), (1− α)p+ αr], (4.2)
4.2.2 Transformation technique for LN demand
As pointed out in Gimpl-Heersink [39], for loss-neutral(LN) demand func-
tion, Rˆt(p, r) is not jointly-concave in (p, r). This poses significant challenge
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for the commonly-used approach which requires joint-concavity to be pre-
served from period to period. As a result, the analysis in Gimpl-Heersink
[39] for multi-period model carries on under rather restrictive assumptions
which does not include LN demand. We also like to point out that for a two-
period setting, Gimpl-Heersink [39] proved the joint-concavity of the function
to be maximized in the Bellman Equation, even though the revenue function
is not jointly-concave, and nor is the profit-to-go function from period 1. Un-
fortunately, their approach of calculating the profit-to-go functions explicitly
does not extend to multi-period analysis. Here, we show that by making a
carefully-chosen transformation on Rˆt(p, r), we can make it jointly-concave
and supermodular. Specifically, we make the following transformation on the
profit-to-go function:
φt(x, r) = φˆt(x, r)− λtr2.
Where λt are real numbers that are yet to be specified. By introducing φt,
we can write the recursion in terms of this new function:
φt(x, r) = max
y≥x,p∈P
Rˆt(p, r)− λtr2 − EH[y − dt(p, r)m]
+ γEφt−1[y − dt(p, r)m − a, (1− α)p+ αr] + γλt−1[(1− α)p+ αr]2. (4.3)
We combine a few terms and write this as:
φt(x, r) = max
y≥x,p∈P
Rt(p, r;λ)− EH[y − dt(p, r)m]
+ γEφt−1[y − dt(p, r)m − a, (1− α)p+ αr] (4.4)
where
Rt(p, r;λ) = Rˆt(p, r)− λtr2 + γλt−1[(1− α)p+ αr]2. (4.5)
The next theorem gives a condition under which there indeed exists λt that
makes Rˆt(p, r;λ) jointly-concave and supermodular.
Lemma 4.2.1. When demand parameters vary proportionally at/at−1 =
ηt/ηt−1 = kt and the ratio kt ≥ max
{
γα, γ
(
αa+η
a+η
)2}
, there exist λt ≥ 0
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such that Rt(p, r;λ) is jointly-concave and supermodular in (p, r).
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Remark.The condition here is a sufficient condition and by no means nec-
essary. The expression in max sign is between (0, 1), hence we are requiring
demand fluctuation to have limited downside movement. As an example,
with γ = 0.99, α = 0.3, a = 10, η = 6, this bound is max{0.297, 0.313} =
0.313 which allows a lot of room for demand fluctuation. As a special case,
when parameters are stationary: at = a, bt = b and ηt = η, the condition
trivially holds.
We carry out our subsequent analysis under the assumption that this trans-
formation is possible. Since the choice of λt will no longer be of interest, we
suppress λt and write the transformed revenue function as Rt(p, r).
4.2.3 Optimality of base-stock policy
For the finite horizon model, we now prove that a base-stock policy is optimal.
For each t, the decision variables y and p attaining maximum in (4.4) are
denoted by y∗t (x, r) and p
∗
t (x, r). Optimality of base-stock policy is given by
the theorem below.
Theorem 4.2.1. For the finite horizon model under LN demand, at any
period t, the optimal profit-to-go function φt(x, r) is jointly concave in (x, r).
Furthermore, the optimal inventory decision follows a base-stock policy. That
is, there exists a base-stock function y0t (r) and:
y∗t (x, r) =
{
y0t (r) when x ≤ y0t (r)
x when x > y0t (r).
Proof. By Lemma 4.2.1 and the discussion following it, we can assume that
our revenue function R(p, r) is jointly-concave. We now prove the theorem
by induction. For t = 0 since φ0(x, r) = 0, φ0 is jointly concave in (x, r).
Now assume φt−1(x, r) is jointly concave in (x, r). Since dt(p, r) is a linear
function of p and r, φt−1[y− dt(p, r)m− a, (1− α)p+ αr] is jointly concave
in (y, p, r) for any (m, a). Passing that through expectation sign, Eφt−1[y−
dt(p, r)m − a, (1− α)p+ αr] is jointly concave in (y, p, r). Similarly we can
prove joint concavity of EH[y− dt(p, r)m]. Lastly, Rt(p, r) is assumed to be
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jointly concave in (p, r). Therefore the function in (4.4) before maximization
is jointly concave in (x, y, p, r). And finally since maximization preserves
joint-concavity, φt(x, r) is jointly concave in (x, r).
Suppose the maximization in (4.4) is taken over p first, then we get a
function Ft(y, r) which is joint-concave in (y, r). Ft(y, r) is the maximized
over y ≥ x. For each r let y0t (r) be the smallest maximizer of Ft(y, r),
optimality of the base-stock policy follows from the concavity of Ft(y, r).
Again, to compare with previous results, Gimpl-Heersink [39] proved that
a base-stock list-price is optimal for the two-period model. Here, under
a multi-period setting, we were able to prove the optimality of a base-stock
policy. Whether a list-price policy is optimal, in other words whether p∗(x, r)
is a nonincreasing function of x for any given r, is still unknown.
A closely related problem is the monotonicity of the base-stock level y0t (r)
with respect to r. Gimpl-Heersink [39] proved for the one-period model under
additive demand uncertainty that y0t (r) is non-decreasing in r. We point out
that this is simply a consequence of the one-period revenue function R(d, r)
(written in terms of variables (d, r)) is supermodular in (d, r). For one-
period model we can set γ = 0 and furthermore under additive demand
uncertainty, base-stock level y0(r) is simply the optimal demand d0(r) plus a
fixed amount of safety stock. Hence monotonicity of y0(r) in the one-period
model follows from the monotonicity of d0(r), and the latter is guaranteed
by supermodularity of R(d, r).
For multi-period models, monotonicity of the base-stock level becomes a
nontrivial question. Technical difficulty arise from the fact that supermodu-
larity of the profit-to-go function φt(x, r) is not preserved in the expression
γEφt−1[y − d(p, r, ), (1 − α)p + αr]. Interestingly, all our numerical results
for the multi-period problem shows that the optimal base-stock d0t (r) level
is monotonically non-decreasing in r. This is even true under a significant
amount of multiplicative uncertainty. As an example, Figure 4.2.3 shows the
optimal base-stock level vs. reference price with the following parameters:
γ = 0.99, α = 0.15, c = 0.2, h = 0.1, s = 0.15, b = 40, a = 20, η =
20, V ar(a) = 5, V ar(m) = 0.1.
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Figure 4.1: Base-stock level vs. reference price
4.3 Infinite Horizon Stochastic Model
We now turn to the infinite horizon version of our model. For infinite hori-
zon, we are interested in the asymptotic property of the optimal trajectory,
under some sample path. Namely we want to prove that the optimal trajec-
tory converge to some stationary state. Furthermore, we want to find out
properties that characterize these steady states. These two questions will be
answered in this and the next section.
Since we are dealing with the infinite horizon problem now, subscript t
is dropped and the profit-to-go function is now φ(x, r). We first prove a
property of φ(x, r):
Theorem 4.3.1. φ(x, r) satisfies:
(a) φ(x, r) is decreasing in x for fixed r.
(b) If p ≥ c, then φ(x, r) is increasing in r for fixed x.
Proof. Part 1 of the theorem is quite obvious: right-hand-side of (4.4) is a
maximization over y ≥ x and r ∈ P . Increasing x shrinks the feasible set of
that maximization, while leaving the function itself intact. Therefore φ(x, r)
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decreases in x for fixed r. As for part 2, remember the finite horizon Bellman
Equation:
φt(x, r) = max
y≥x,p∈P
Π(y, p, r) + γEφt−1[y −D(p, r, ), (1− α)p+ αr]
with φ0(x, r) = 0. We can prove that φt(x, r) converges to φ(x, r) point-
wise. First observe that φ0(x, r) is increasing in r for fixed x. Assume that
φt−1(x, r) is increasing in r for fixed x. Let r ≥ c and (y, p) be optimal for
the initial condition (x, r). For any r′ ≥ r and close to r, we can pick p′ ≥ p
such that D(p, r, ) = D(p′, r′, ) for any realization of . Therefore
φt(x, r
′) ≥ Π(y, p′, r′) + γEφt−1[y −D(p′, r′, ), (1− α)p′ + αr′]
≥ Π(y, p, r) + γEφt−1[y −D(p, r, ), (1− α)p′ + αr′]
≥ Π(y, p, r) + γEφt−1[y −D(p, r, ), (1− α)p+ αr]
= φt(x, r).
Since φt(x, r) converges to φ(x, r) point-wise, we have that φ(x, r) is in-
creasing in r for fixed x.
Before moving on to the detailed analysis, we first give a brief roadmap.
Compared to a classical joint inventory-and-pricing model, our Bellman equa-
tion has one more state variable r. This added dimension of state space brings
significant challenge. Therefore we first propose a simplification of the prob-
lem, prove results for this simplified version, then demonstrate how we can
use it as an auxiliary tool to establish results for our original problem.
Specifically we make the following simplification. Assume now that the
retailer is allowed to return products back to the manufacturer and get a
full refund. In mathematical terms, this is equivalent to allowing order-up-to
level y to be less than initial inventory x. This allows us to divide and conquer
the difficulties that our original model poses. Subsection (4.3.1) establishes
structural results for this simplified model. Then Subsection (4.3.2) uses it
to prove results for the original model.
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4.3.1 When return is allowed
When return is allowed, the dynamic programming equation can be written
as:
φ(x, r) = max
y,p∈P
R(p, r)−EH[y−D(p, r)m]+γEφ[y−D(p, r)m−a, (1−α)p+αr].
where H(x) , Ehγ(x− a) is convex because hγ(·) is convex. It is easy to
see that the right-hand-side(RHS) does not involve x at all. Therefore φ(x, r)
is indeed only a function of r. This reduces the dimension of our dynamic
programming equation to one, which is the main merit of this simplification.
Note that Eφ(x−a, r) = φ(r), the dynamic programming equation simplifies
to:
φ(r) = max
y,p∈P
R(p, r)− EH[y − d(p, r)m] + γφ[(1− α)p+ αr]. (4.6)
We now do a variable change: let q = (1− α)p+ αr be the new reference
price if price is chosen to be p. Equivalently p = q−αr
1−α . The above formulation
can be written in terms of q:
φ(r) = max
y,q∈Qr
R
(
q − αr
1− α , r
)
− EH
[
y − d
(
q − αr
1− α , r
)
m
]
+ γφ(q)(4.7)
, max
q∈Qr
[R˜(q, r)− (min
y
G(y, q, r)) + γφ(q)].
Where Qr = (1 − α)P + αr and R˜(·) is the expected revenue function
now in terms of (q, r). The above dynamic programming formulation can by
optimized through some optimal response function q∗(r). The next theorem
presents monotonicity results of q∗(r):
Lemma 4.3.1. The response function q∗(r) that maximizes (4.8) is nonde-
creasing in r.
Proof. Our arguments will be based on properties of supermodular functions.
One is referred to Topkis [56] for a general treatment of this topic.
For arbitrary r, r′ ∈ P , r ≤ r′ and q ∈ Qr, q′ ∈ Qr′ , since Qr = (1−α)P +
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αr, it is not hard to prove that min(q, q′) ∈ Qr and max(q, q′) ∈ Qr′ , in other
words, the set {(q, r) : q ∈ Qr, r ∈ P} is a lattice.
In order to prove that q∗(r) is nondecreasing in r, by Theorem 2.8.2 in
Topkis [56] we only need to prove the function R(q, r) − miny G(y, q, r) is
supermodular. We assumed that R˜(p, r) is supermodular in (p, r), by Lemma
2 in Popescu and Wu [48] R˜(q, r) should also be supermodular in (q, r).
Also, by Lemma 2.6.1 in Topkis [56], sum of two supermodular functions is
supermodular. What’s left to prove is that the function miny G(y, q, r) is
submodular. This is, in its full form, the following function:
min
y
EH
[
y −D
(
q − αr
1− α , r
)
m
]
.
First of all note that H(·) is convex. Therefore for any fixed m, H(y−dm)
is jointly convex in y and d. Taking expectation over m preserves convexity,
that is: EH(y − dm) is convex. Minimizing this function with respect to y
gives a convex function of d: miny EH(y − dm). Finally, replace d by the
following expression:
d = a− a+ η
1− αq +
[
η +
α(a+ η)
1− α
]
r
This is a linear function in q and r with opposite signs. Therefore by
Theorem 2.6.2 in Topkis [56] the resulting function is submodular in q and
r.
This completes our argument that the one-period profit function is super-
modular. And therefore q∗(r) is nondecreasing in r.
Lemma (4.3.1) leads directly to the following stability and convergence
result:
Theorem 4.3.2. In the case when return is allowed and under LN demand,
starting from any state, with probability 1 the system will converge to a sta-
tionary price and a fixed base-stock level along an optimal trajectory. Fur-
thermore, convergence to the stationary price is monotone.
Proof. Theorem 4.3.2 is essentially a consequence of Lemma 4.3.1. It can be
proved in much the same way as the proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 in
Popescu and Wu [48]. We therefore omit the proof here.
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4.3.2 When return is not allowed
Now we come back to the case when return is not allowed, that is, the max-
imization over inventory is now taken for y ≥ x. To simplify our subsequent
discussion we introduce a few notations: Let I∗ be the system when return
is not allowed. And let I0 be a system with the same parameters as I∗
but allowing return. Let the profit-to-go functions in the two systems be
φ∗(x, r), φ0(r), respectively (remember x is not a state variable for I0). φ0(r)
should be the solution to the dynamic programming equation in (4.6) and
φ∗(x, r) should be the solution to:
φ∗(x, r) = max
y≥x,p∈P
R(p, r)− EH[y − d(p, r)m]
+ γE[φ∗(y − d(p, r)m − a, (1− α)p+ αr] (4.8)
We first look at additive demand uncertainty, that is, d(p, r, ) = d(p, r) +
a. For any state (x, r), denote the optimal decision for I
0 by [y0(r), p0(r)]
and the optimal decision for I∗ by [y∗(x, r), p∗(x, r)]. The major obstacle
to proving convergence in system I∗ is that I∗ cannot always mimic the
behavior of I0: when y0(r) < x, y∗(x, r) cannot be equal to y0(r) because of
the constraint y∗(x, r) ≥ x. This is due to a high level in initial inventory
x so whenever this happens, we say the inventory level “blocks” the optimal
solution y0(r). Because of this discrepancy, we cannot reduce I∗ to a one-
dimensional dynamic program like we did for I0. However the following
theorem guarantees the same type of path-wise convergence result for I∗:
Theorem 4.3.3. Under LN demand with additive uncertainty, starting sys-
tem I∗ from any state and with probability 1 it will eventually converge to a
steady state in which price remains stable and inventory is replenished up to
some fixed base-stock level in each period.
Proof. We prove by comparing the two systems I0 and I∗ and we first divide
the state space S = {(x, r) | r ∈ P} into two complementary sets: S1 ,
{(x, r) ∈ S | y0(r) ≥ x}, and S2 = S \ S1. See Figure 1 for a graphical
representation. In words, if any state belongs to S1, it means that inventory
is low enough such that the optimal decision for I0 is also feasible for I∗.
Our proof relies on proving the following three facts:
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(a) For (x, r) ∈ S1, suppose I∗ follows I0’s decisions y0(r) and p0(r), then
the new state (x′, r′) is still in S1, regardless of demand uncertainty a.
(b) If (x, r) ∈ S1, then it is indeed optimal for I∗ to follow I0’s decisions:
y∗(x, r) = y0(r), p∗(x, r) = p0(r).
(c) For (x, r) ∈ S2, y∗(x, r) = x. In words, if the initial inventory is too
high that it blocks the order quantity y0(r), then system I∗ would
choose to not make an order.
Intuitively, fact (c) guarantees that if the system starts at high inventory
(x, r) ∈ S2, then it will make no order and let its inventory drop down. After
this transient phase of reducing inventory, the state will enter S1. From then
on, fact (a) and (b) jointly guarantees that I∗ would follow I0’s strategies
and the state will remain in S1 from then on.
We first prove fact (a). For additive demand uncertainty: D(p, r, ) =
d(p, r) + a, holding cost becomes H[y − d(p, r)] and the maximization over
y can be taken explicitly. Assume the largest minimizer of H(·) is xmin and
the minimum is H∗, then y0(r) = argmin
y
H[y− d0(r)] = xmin + d0(r). where
d0(r) = d[p0(r), r] is the expected demand under optimal decisions. Suppose
(x, r) ∈ S1 and the optimal expected demands are d01 for the current period
and d02 for the next period. Then after the current period inventory level
would become xmin+d
0
1−d01− a while the next period requires an inventory
level no more than xmin + d
0
2 so that the optimal order is not blocked. This
leads to the inequality:
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xmin + d
0
1 − d01 − a ≤ xmin + d02.
But this inequality is equivalent to d02 + a ≥ 0 which always holds by
Assumption (4.2.1). Therefore the state at the next period remains in S1.
We now turn to fact (b), Note that φ∗(x, r) ≤ φ0(r) since any feasible
decision for system I∗ is also feasible for I0. Also, by fact 1, once the state
enters S1, if I
∗ mimics I0’s strategy it can continue doing so. This gives
a feasible solution for I∗ with a profit identical to the optimal profit in I0.
Therefore φ∗(x, r) = φ0(r) for (x, r) ∈ S1 and it is indeed optimal for I∗ to
mimic I0: y∗(x, r) = y0(r),p∗(x, r) = p0(r).
Finally we prove fact (c). We first introduce some more notations. Define
[y˜∗(x, r), p˜∗(x, r)] as follows:
[y˜∗(x, r), p˜∗(x, r)] = argmax
y,p∈P
R(p, r)− EH[y − d(p, r)m]
+ γEφ∗[y − d(p, r)m − a, (1− α)p+ αr] (4.9)
In case that there are multiple maximizers, choose the one with the smallest
y. This is the same equation as (4.8) only relaxing the constraint y ≥ x. Note
the critical difference between this and (4.6): the profit-to-go function here
is still φ∗(x, r) and in some sense we are only relaxing the constraint y ≥ x
in the current period.
We want to prove that y˜∗(x, r) ≤ y0(r). Assume the opposite is true, that
is, y˜∗(x, r) > y0(r). To make our argument more concise, let F 0(y, p; r) and
F ∗(y, p;x, r) be the functions behind maximization sign in (4.6) and (4.9),
respectively. Since φ∗(x, r) ≤ φ0(r) for all (x, r), F ∗(y, p;x, r) ≤ F 0(y, p; r)
for all (y, p) and all (x, r). We now claim that the following inequalities hold:
F ∗[y˜∗(x, r), p˜∗(x, r)] ≤ F 0[y˜∗(x, r), p˜∗(x, r)]
≤ F 0[y0(r), p0(r)]
= F ∗[y0(r), p0(r)].
The first inequality holds because F ∗(y, p;x, r) ≤ F 0(y, p; r) for any (x, r)
and any (y, p), as stated before. The second inequality holds because [y0(r), p0(r)]
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maximizes F 0(y, p;x, r). The equality on the last line requires a slightly more
careful argument, which we now make. Remember that under additive de-
mand, y0(r) = xmin+d[p
0(r)]. We can follow exactly the same argument when
we were proving fact (a), and show that the new state would remain in S1.
More precisely, define x′ = y0(r)− d[p0(r)]m− a and r′ = (1−α)p0(r) +αr
then we can prove that (x′, r′) ∈ S1 with probability 1. Therefore using fact
(b) it is clear that φ∗(x′, r′) = φ0(r′) for all the possible outcomes of x′. and
hence F 0(y0(r), p0(r)) = F ∗(y0(r), p0(r)).
The inequalities show that [y0(r), p0(r)] is another maximizer of F ∗ with
y0(r) < y˜∗(x, r), which contradicts our assumption that y˜∗ is the smallest
such maximizer. Therefore y˜∗(x, r) ≤ y0(r) always holds.
Finally, remember that the inventory cost H[y − d(p, r)m] is concave in
y. From our proof in Theorem 4.2.1 we also know that φ∗[y − d(p, r)m −
a, (1 − α)p + αr] is concave in y. Therefore F ∗(y, p;x, r) is concave in y.
For any state (x, r) with x > y0(r) and decision (y, p) with y > x, we know
that x > y˜∗(x, r). By concavity of F ∗ and that y˜∗(x, r) is its maximizer,
F ∗(y, p;x, r) ≤ F ∗(x, p;x, r) and therefore the optimal decision at (x, r) is
to not make any order and let inventory remain at x. The proof is now
complete.
The proof above actually gives a good sketch of what the optimal reference
price path would look like. When initial inventory is high, the system will
go through a transient stage where it makes no replenishments. We do not
know whether the reference price is monotone or not in this transient stage.
But once the state (s, r) enters S1 (and it always will by fact (c)), it will
stay in S1(fact (a)) and the reference price thereafter will converge to r
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monotonically.
We now extend this convergence result to LA demand, or the case where
η+ ≤ η−. Specifically, we show that when demand uncertainty is additive, the
desired monotone convergence still holds. The technique we use here, which
was also used both in Fibich et al. [36] and in Popescu and Wu [48], applies to
a wide range of dynamic programs with kinked reward structure. Intuitively
the argument goes as follows: With the kinked price shock function, under
an optimal reference price trajectory, only one of those linear pieces would
matter. This is because under an optimal pricing policy, the reference price
monotonically converge to its optimal value, therefore the “price shock” pt−rt
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is either always positive or always negative and only one side of the function
Q(r− p) would affect the outcome. This is the content of the next theorem:
Theorem 4.3.4. Under demand with Loss Aversion defined in (4.2.1) and
additive demand uncertainty, starting system I∗ from any state and with
probability 1 it will eventually converge to a steady state in which price re-
mains stable and inventory is replenished up to some fixed base-stock level in
each period.
Proof. For system I∗ denote its reference price effect by Q∗(r−p) = η+ · (r−
p)+ + η− · (p− r)+. Because η+ ≤ η−, we can write this as:
Q∗(r − p) = min
η∈[η+,η−]
η · (r − p). (4.10)
For any η ∈ [η+, η−], we construct a system that is otherwise identical
to I∗ but has a loss-neutral reference price effect Qη(r − p) = η · (r − p),
we call it I(η). From Equation (4.10) we know Q∗(r − p) ≤ Qη(r − p) for
any η ∈ [η+, η−]. Thus for any price trajectory in P , system I(η) generates
more profit than I∗ (remember we assumed that p ≥ c so that profit margin
is always non-negative). Let the profit-to-go function corresponding to I(η)
be φ(x, r; η). Then φ∗(x, r) ≤ φ(x, r; η) for any η ∈ [η+, η−]. The reason is
that the two systems have exactly the same feasible set, while I(η) always
generate no less profit than I∗. From Theorem 4.3.3 we know that system
I(η+) yields a steady state r(η+) while I(η−) yields a steady state r(η−).
Suppose system I∗ starts from some r < r(η−), then one feasible trajectory
for I∗ is to mimic the optimal trajectory of I(η−). Since this trajectory is
optimal for I(η−) and that φ∗(x, r) ≤ φ(x, r; η−), this trajectory is indeed
optimal for I∗ as well. Hence reference price for I∗ would be monotonically
increase and converge to r(η−). The case where r > r(η+) is the same:
reference price for I∗ would monotonically decrease and converge to r(η+).
When r(η+) < r < r(η−), it is not hard to show that there exists η ∈
[η+, η−] such that r is the steady state for system I(η). Similarly we have
φ∗(x, r) ≤ φ(x, r; η) and since a stationary reference price at r is optimal for
I(η), it is optimal for I∗ as well.
Remark.The proof of this theorem also give a good sketch of the optimal
trajectory. In the loss-averse case, there will be an interval of steady states,
each of those states corresponds to an unique η ∈ [η+, η−]. Starting from
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any reference price, in an optimal trajectory the system will converge to the
nearest steady state and stay there.
We make a note that Theorem 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 do not cover multiplicative
demand uncertainty. Specifically our proof of fact 1 and 3 in Theorem 4.3.3
requires additive uncertainty. Our numerical experiments do show that the
same kind of convergence should hold for multiplicative demand as well. This
is true even when V ar(m) gets very significant. As an example, Figure 4.3.2
shows the optimal trajectories of reference price (inventory is not plotted
here) with the following parameters: γ = 0.99, α = 0.15, c = 0.2, h =
0.1, s = 0.15, b = 40, a = 20, η = 20, V ar(a) = 5, V ar(m) = 0.1.
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Figure 4.3: Reference price path under LN demand
This phenomenon suggests that for multiplicative demand uncertainty,
there should also be some type of convergence at work. Although for mul-
tiplicative demand uncertainty, we cannot make the same arguments as we
did for Theorem 4.3.3, and hence we cannot prove global convergence of the
reference price path. Local convergence can indeed be guaranteed, and that
is the content of the next theorem. Define S1 in the same way as in the proof
of Theorem 4.3.3 and we have:
Theorem 4.3.5. Under LN demand with multiplicative uncertainty, there
exists an open neighborhood B(r∗) around the optimal steady state r∗ such
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that, if system I∗ starts from any state (x, r) ∈ S1 with r ∈ B(r∗), then with
probability 1 it will eventually converge to the steady state r∗ in which price
remains stable and inventory is replenished up to some fixed base-stock level
in each period.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Figure 4.3.2 gives an example of the optimal trajectories under LA demand.
Remember that under LA demand there exists an interval of steady states
instead of an unique one. Starting from any initial state and the system
would converge to a state within that interval, and stay there. Of course
under LN demand the interval of steady states shrinks to an unique point.
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Figure 4.4: Reference price path under LA demand
The reason why there is not a similar convergence result for the loss-seeking
case, is because an optimal trajectory can indeed cycle infinitely. Figure 4.3.2
provides some numerical examples of this phenomenon. Here we would like
to point out that in a purely dynamic pricing setting, these properties were
already observed in Popescu and Wu [48], alongside with various economic
intuitions. What we have shown here is that these properties still hold when
inventory cost is included explicitly in the model.
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Figure 4.5: Reference price path under LS demand
4.4 Characterizing the Steady-State
In the previous section we’ve established the existence of steady states and
proved global convergence properties. The next step is of course to charac-
terize these steady states. Specifically, suppose r is an optimal steady-state
reference price for the problem. we carry out a perturbation analysis, that
is, we look at the value-to-go when price path stays at r, and then compare
it to a perturbed path in which reference price takes a small perturbation
around the steady-state, then returns back to it. The total discounted profit
for the perturbed path should be no more than that of the steady-state path,
and we therefore get the condition characterizing optimality of steady-state
price.
In this section, we use a more general demand function, so that it becomes
easier to compare with previous results obtained in Popescu and Wu [48].
Assumption 4.4.1. Expected demand is now given by:
d(p, r) = d(p) +Q(r − p, r) (4.11)
where Q(r − p, r) denotes the reference price effect in demand.
The corresponding revenue function can be written as:
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R(p, r) = (p− c)d(p) + (p− c)Q(r − p, r) , R(p) +Rr(p, r). (4.12)
We assume that these functions are all differentiable.
4.4.1 Loss neutral demand
When demand is loss-neutral. The function Q(x, r) should have equal left-
and right-derivative. That is: lim
δ→0
Q(δ,r)
δ
= η(r) > 0. Consider two reference
price paths: one stays constant at r while the other is perturbed: r, r −
(1 − α)δ, r, r, r, · · · . The price path corresponding to this perturbation is
r − δ, r + αδ, r, r, · · · . We first introduce a few notations: let Ψ(d, y) =
EH(y− md) be the expected holding cost, and let ψ(d) , miny Ψ(d, y). We
replacing the holding cost term in Equation (4.6) by our new notations:
φ(r) = max
p
R(p, r)− ψ[d(p, r)] + γφ[(1− α)p+ αr]. (4.13)
The total value without perturbation is:
V0 = R(r, r)− ψ[d(r, r)] + γ[R(r, r)− ψ[d(r, r)]] + γ2φ(r).
Total value for the perturbed problem is:
Vδ = R(r − δ, r)− ψ[d(r − δ, r)] + γ[R[r + αδ, r − (1− α)δ]
− ψ[d(r + αδ, r − (1− α)δ)]] + γ2φ(r).
By optimality V0 ≥ Vδ should hold. When δ is small, we take the first-
order Taylor expansion on each of the terms above, cancel out the principle
components on both sides, and arrive at an inequality characterizing opti-
mality:
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Vδ = R(r, r)−Rp(r, r)δ − ψ[d(r, r)] + ψ′[d(r, r)]dp(r, r)δ + γR(r, r)
−Rr(r, r)(1− α)γδ +Rp(r, r)αγδ − ψ[d(r, r)]γ
+ ψ′[d(r, r)]γdr(r, r)(1− α)δ − ψ′[d(r, r)]γdp(r, r)αδ + γ2φ(r)
≤ R(r, r)− ψ[d(r, r)] + γR(r, r)− γψ[d(r, r)] + γ2φ(r) = V0.
We can simplify the above inequality and use the fact that δ can be both
positive or negative to get the following condition: (suppressing function
arguments(r, r))
−Rp + ψ′dp − (1− α)γRr + αγRp + γψ′(1− α)dr − γψ′dpα = 0.
This further simplifies into:
(1−αγ)R′(r)+(γ−1)(r− c)η(r)−ψ′[d(r)] · [(1−αγ)d′(r)− (1−γ)η(r)] = 0.
(4.14)
To compare with the result in Popescu and Wu [48], note that if we ignore
the holding cost part ψ(·) and let R(p, r) take the form in (4.12), then the
inequality reduces to:
(1− αγ)R′(r) = (1− γ)(r − c)η(r). (4.15)
Not surprisingly this coincides with the result in Popescu and Wu [48].
Since the additional term in (4.14) corresponds to inventory costs, we can
compare the solutions of (4.14) and (4.15) and find out the effect of adding
inventory considerations. Namely we want to know whether inventory cost
would raise or lower the steady state price. To answer this question, we make
use of the following property of the function ψ(d):
Lemma 4.4.1. ψ′(d) ≥ 0 for any d.
Proof. Remember ψ(d) = miny Ψ(y, d), by the envelope theorem:
ψ′(d) =
∂Ψ
∂d
∣∣∣∣
(y∗(d),d))
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Let f(·) be the pdf of m then:
∂Ψ
∂d
= −
∫ ∞
0
H ′(y − ud)uf(u)du
Since y∗(d) = arg miny Ψ(y, d), we have ∂Ψ∂y
∣∣∣
(y∗(d),d)
= 0. That is:
∫ ∞
0
H ′[y∗(d)− ud]f(u)du = 0.
H(·) is convex and continuously differentiable. Therefore there should exist
a changeover point u0 for which:
H ′(u)
{
≥ 0 when u ≤ u0
≤ 0 when u ≥ u0.
Therefore,
ψ′(d) = −
∫ ∞
0
H ′[y∗(d)− ud]uf(u)du
= −
∫ ∞
0
H ′[y∗(d)− ud]uf(u)du+ u0
∫ ∞
0
H ′[y∗(d)− ud]f(u)du
= −
∫ u0
0
H ′[y∗(d)− ud](u− u0)f(u)du
−
∫ ∞
u0
H ′[y∗(d)− ud](u− u0)f(u)du.
Both the two terms are non-negative by our choice of u0. Hence ψ
′(d) ≥
0.
Remark.This theorem states that larger expected demand d always leads
to higher inventory cost. This is largely due to the multiplicative demand
uncertainty. When d increases, variance of the stochastic demand D = dm+
a also increases. And intuitively speaking, increased demand uncertainty
leads to increased inventory cost.
Theorem 4.4.1. Under LN demand given in Definition 4.2.1, adding inven-
tory cost always lead to higher steady-state reference price.
Proof. Remember that R(r) = (r−c)d(r) therefore R′(r) = d(r)+(r−c)d′(r).
Using this and we can transform (4.14) into:
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d(r) = (r − c− ψ′[d(r)])
[
1− γ
1− αγη(r)− d
′(r)
]
. (4.16)
With LN demand, η(r) ≡ η and d(r) = b−ar. The above equation further
simplifies into:
b− ar = (r − c)
[
1− γ
1− αγ + a
]
− ψ′(b− ar)
[
1− γ
1− αγ + a
]
. (4.17)
Let r0 be the solution to this equation when the term ψ
′[b− ar] does not
exist. This corresponds to the steady-state reference price when there are no
inventory cost. If we put back inventory cost in Equation (4.17) and suppose
the new solution is r. By Lemma 4.4.1 we know ψ′[b − ar] ≥ 0. If r < r0,
then
b− ar > b− ar0
= (r0 − c)
[
1− γ
1− αγ + a
]
> (r − c)
[
1− γ
1− αγ + a
]
≥ (r − c)
[
1− γ
1− αγ + a
]
− ψ′(b− ar)
[
1− γ
1− αγ + a
]
.
Which contradicts with Equation (4.17). Therefore in order to balance the
equation r has to be no less than r0.
The economic intuition behind this is very clear: When inventory cost
is brought into the picture, total cost is raised and thus profit margin is
lowered. Therefore in order to maintain the original profitability, price has
to be raised.
4.4.2 Loss-averse and loss-seeking demand
When reference price effect function Q(x, r) has a kink at x = 0, namely let
lim
δ→0+
Q(δ,r)
δ
= η+(r) and lim
δ→0−
Q(δ,r)
δ
= η−(r) where η+ 6= η−. Again, we apply
the perturbation analysis done in the previous section. Note that since the
left and right derivative of Q(x, r) are not equal, the sign of the perturbation
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matters and by perturbing the stationary reference price r in both directions,
we get the following pair of inequalities:
(1− αγ)R′(r)− (r − c)(η+(r)− γη−(r))
− ψ′[d(r)][(1− γα)d′(r)− η+(r) + γη−(r)] ≥ 0.
(1− αγ)R′(r)− (r − c)(η−(r)− γη+(r))
− ψ′[d(r)][(1− γα)d′(r)− η−(r) + γη+(r)] ≤ 0.
We can write the pair in a more concise way:
η+(r)− γη−(r) ≤ (1− αγ)[R
′(r)− ψ′[d(r)]d′(r)]
r − c− ψ′[d′(r)] ≤ η
−(r)− γη+(r). (4.18)
From this it’s clear that there exists a stationary reference price r only
when η+(r) ≤ η−(r), which corresponds to the case when consumers are
loss-averse. Furthermore, when reference price effect is kinked linear, η+
and η− are not dependent on r, and there is an easy parameterization that
characterizes all the stationary reference prices. Since this follows directly
from the inequality in (4.18), we state it as a proposition and omit the proof:
Proposition 4.4.1. When η+ ≤ η−, the set of all stationary reference prices
is given by {r(η) | η ∈ [η+, η−]} where r(η) solves:
(1− αγ)[R′(r)− ψ′[d(r)]d′(r)]
r − c− ψ′[d′(r)] = (1− γ)η.
The proposition states that any steady state reference price for the loss-
averse model is also the steady state reference price for some loss-neutral
model with η ∈ [η+, η−]. Hence by Theorem (4.4.1), adding inventory costs
still lead to higher steady states, which matches with our discussion in the
previous section. In the loss-averse case, steady states form an interval with
each point in the interval corresponding to some η ∈ [η+, η−]. Starting the
system from any reference price and it will converge to the nearst state in
that interval.
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4.4.3 Strategic vs. myopic decision making
Reference price effect dictates that the decision makers have to be forward-
looking when planning their inventory and pricing policies. This is why
we adopted the dynamic programming formulation (4.13) to analyze the
problem. Failure to take into account future consequences of current deci-
sions(myopic decision making) would of course lead to suboptimal decisions.
We would also like to know whether myopic decision making leads to higher
or lower price and reference price.
A forward-looking(strategic) planner would carry out the maximization
(4.13) in each period, while a myopic planner would simply ignore the last
term γφ[(1−α)p+αr]. By Theorem (4.3.1) φ(r) is increasing in r, therefore
the strategic planner who takes into account this term, would choose a price
that’s higher than what the myopic planner would choose. As for the steady
state, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4.4.2. Under LN demand, reference price under a myopic de-
cision maker would also reach a steady state rM . rM is given by the following
condition:
d(r) = (r − c− ψ′[b− ar])[η + a]. (4.19)
Furthermore, r ≥ rM , that is, strategic decision making always leads to
higher steady state reference price compared to myopic decision making.
Proof. Note that by setting γ in the dynamic programming equation (4.13)
to 0, we end up with a myopic policy. Therefore convergence to a steady
state rM is guaranteed for the myopic planner.
This equation is very similar to Equation (4.16). Since γ < 1 and α < 1,
we know 1−γ
1−αγ < 1 Using an argument that’s similar to the proof of Theo-
rem 4.4.1, we can prove that r ≥ rM .
Remark.The intuition to this is very clear: under myopic decision making,
the planner cares only about current period profit and he would reduce price
to boost current period sales. This leads to lower steady-state reference price
and is detrimental to the firm’s long-term profit.
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4.4.4 The effect of neglecting reference price effect
We are also interested in a closely related question: What are the conse-
quences when the decision maker is not aware of the reference price effect. In
other words the decision maker believes that demand function is d(p) while in
reality it’s d(p) +Q(r− p, r). Note the distinction between this case and the
previous strategic vs. myopic case: a decision maker who ignores reference
price effect would still make forward-looking decisions to maximize his firm’s
total discounted profit. The following proposition answers our question:
Proposition 4.4.3. Under LN demand and when the reference price effect
is neglected, a system would converge to its steady state rN characterized by
the following equation:
d(p) = −[p− c− ψ′[d(p)]]d′(p). (4.20)
Furthermore, r ≤ rN .
Proof. In this case, the decision maker’s problem simplifies to the following
one-period maximization problem:
max
p,r
(p− c)d(p)− EH[y − d(p)m].
Equation (4.20) is exactly the first order optimality condition of this max-
imization problem. Equation (4.20) is also very similar to Equation (4.19),
with p replacing r. So again, using an argument that’s similar to the proof
of Theorem 4.4.1, we can prove that r ≤ rN .
Remark.This fact also makes intuitive sense: with reference price effect,
a higher price hurts demand not only through the base demand function, but
also through reference price effect. A decision maker who is aware of this
additional effect should of course be more wary of raising his price, Compared
to a decision maker who only cares about the base demand function.
4.5 Conclusion
Our paper studies a joint inventory and pricing model under reference price
effect. This provides new insights into how inventory decision interacts with
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pricing decision under the presence of reference price effect. The major dif-
ficulty in this integrated approach is that reference price effect links pricing
decision in difference periods together. This increases the dimension of the
dynamic program. It further links with inventory replenishment decisions
in each period. Despite the difficulty, we were able to analyze both the fi-
nite horizon and infinite horizon model, and establish a number of structural
results.
For the finite horizon model with LN demand, we proved that a base-stock
policy is always optimal, regardless of the demand uncertainty being additive
or multiplicative.
For infinite horizon model, we first analyzed a simplified model in which
return of inventory is allowed. This allows us to reduce the dimension of
our dynamic program, and establish convergence results: Namely we proved
in Lemma 4.3.1 that in an optimal trajectory, reference price in the next
period q∗ is always a nondecreasing function in the current reference price
r. We then proved the main convergence result (Theorem 4.3.2) which says
that in an optimal trajectory, the state would converge to a steady state
with probability 1. In this process, we made use of a jointly-concave and
supermodular property on the revenue function. Since LN demand function
does not satisfy this assumption, we introduced a transformation technique
to cope with this issue.
We then went back to the case where return is not allowed. Specifically,
under additive demand uncertainty, we were able to prove the same con-
vergence result (Theorem 4.3.3). This result is extended from loss-neutral
demand to loss-averse demand. For multiplicative demand uncertainty, un-
fortunately the same kind of convergence cannot be proved theoretically. We
showed through numerical examples that that should be the case.
We analyzed the steady state that the system should converge to. This
includes a characterization of the steady state for LN and LA demand. We
answered some questions of central interest in this integrated model: Under
LN demand and linear reference price effect, adding inventory considerations
leads to higher steady-state reference price (Theorem 4.4.1); Neglecting ref-
erence price effect leads to higher steady-state reference price. Furthermore,
forward-looking (strategic) decision making leads to higher steady-state ref-
erence price, compared to myopic decision making.
This chapter should only be taken as an initial attempt to inventory and
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pricing models with reference price effect. Several future tasks are specifically
desirable. This includes giving a theoretical proof for convergence in the
multiplicative demand case. Also, it would be very interesting to look at other
types of inventory models. For example in a deterministic and continuous
setting one can look at the EOQ (Economic Order Quantity) model,
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Chapter 5
Stochastic Reference Price Effect: A
Stochastic Optimal Control Perspective
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we continue to build on the model with reference price ef-
fect discussed in the previous chapter. The focus here however, is a purely
economic question: how do one dynamically set the best price to maximize
his profit? The operational question of setting the best inventory level will
not be modeled here. Several seminal papers, already reviewed in the pre-
vious chapter, studied this dynamic pricing problem under reference price
effect. In particular, in a continuous-time framework, Fibich et al. [36]
studied the dynamic pricing problem under both symmetric and asymmetric
demand function. Their work provided an elegant explicit solution to the
optimal price process using optimal control. Extension to oligopolistic con-
petition was also discussed for which the solution tool changed to dynamic
games. Our study, which is also adopting a continuous-time model, has been
inspired by their work.
The following argument marks our departure from previous work in this
area: Since the notion of reference price is a subjective construction, which
cannot be directly measured from transaction records, we argue that the
dynamics of reference price may be subject to noise. Even if two identical
customers are presented with the exact same scenario (in terms of historical
prices), it is not reasonable to assume that they will arrive at the exact same
reference price. Indeed, many previous empirical studies in this area have
been focusing on proposing different models or factors for the formation of
reference price. One is referred to Mazumdar et al. [46] for a review of these
models. the goal in these studies has always been to explain a larger portion
of the variance in the statistical model. In our opinion, it may be benificial
to look at the residual variance and try to explain its nature: whether it is
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due to pure noise or whether it is due to some additional factors not taken
into account. The possibility of there being a pure noise is of course very
significant, again because of the subjective nature of reference price.
Therefore, it is more realistic to model the reference price process as a
stochastic process rather than a deterministic one. We adopt a continuous-
time model similar to the one presented in Fibich et al. [36] and try to
understand the role that a stochastic reference price would play. The rest of
this chapter will proceed as follows: In section 5.2 we propose a model that
allows this random effect in the formation of reference price. We then analyze
the optimal pricing problem in section 5.3. We obtain explicit solutions to
the optimal steady-state price using stochastic optimal control. In section 5.4
we compare our results to that of Fibich et al. [36] and make some sense of
how big a difference it makes by introducing stochastic reference price. In
section 5.5 we extend our analysis to the case of oligopolistic competition
with identical retailers. Finally, conclusions are given in section 5.6.
5.2 Model
We discuss the formation of reference price first. In [36], the authors con-
sidered reference price to be an exponentially-weighted average of historical
prices. With a smoothing factor α, the reference price is given by:
r(t) = e−αt
[
r0 + α
∫ t
0
eαsp(s)ds
]
, t ≥ 0 (5.1)
where r0 is the initial reference price and p(·) is the price process. This ex-
plains the work “exponentially-weighted average” because reference price is a
weighted average of historical prices with the more recent ones weighted more
heavily. In differential form this relationship can be written more concisely
as: {
dr = α[p(t)− r(t)]dt
r(0) = r0
(5.2)
The intuition behind this differential form is quite clear: reference price
starts at an initial value r0, and at a constant rate α, it would drift to close the
gap p(t)− r(t). The resulting r(t) is a deterministic process. Which means,
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with a given initial value r0 and a given price process p(t), the reference price
at any given time is a fixed value for the entire consumer population.
In reality however, since reference price is such a subjective construct, it
is natural to assume that the dynamics of it be subject to noise. When
consumers are forming their reference price, the exact same scenarios might
lead to different reference price paths. Specifically, we extend the above
reference price dynamics using a stochastic differential equation(SDE):
dr(t) = α[p(t)− r(t)]dt+ σ
√
r(t)dW (t). (5.3)
Here W (t) denotes a standard Wiener process and reference price r(t) is
now a stochastic process. At any given time it yields a probability distribu-
tion over all possible prices. For a good reference on the topic of SDE see
[47]. This formulation has been inspired by the CIR model of interest rates
in [30]. The special feature is the
√
r(t) term which makes variance of the
process smaller as r(t) itself gets smaller. Specifically one can prove that the
probability of r going negative is always zero.
Given the above dynamics, we introduce our optimal control problem. The
demand rate function is given as:
D(r, p) = b− ap− η(p− r). (5.4)
The first part of this represents a normal linear demand function and the
second part is the reference price effect. η > 0 controls the magnitude of
this effect. When p(t) < r(t), consumers perceive the deal as a bargain and
demand would rise. On the contrary when p(t) > r(t) demand would fall.
Given the demand rate, revenue would accumulate at the following rate:
F (r, p) = (p− c)D(r, p) = (p− c)[b− ap− η(p− r)] (5.5)
where c is the unit production cost. Given an initial condition r(0) = r0, our
goal is to maximize the total discounted profit over a finite horizon of T (γ is
the discount factor):
Π[p] = E
[∫ T
0
e−γtF [r(t), p(t)]dt
]
. (5.6)
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5.3 Analysis
We adopt a dynamic programming approach. Let V (r, t) be the optimal
“profit-to-go” function at reference price r and time t. In order to better
serve our purpose, we relax some of the mathematical rigor and derive the
equation in a more intuitive way. Consider an infinitesimal increment of time
dt. If one is to take this small step into the future, and wants to take the best
possible step by carefully picking his control p, then V (r, t) should satisfy the
following equation:
V (r, t) = max
p
E
[
F (r, p)dt+ e−γtV (r + dr, t+ dt)
]
. (5.7)
Using Taylor series expansion and suppress the arguments (r, t), the last term
above can be written as:
e−γdtV (r + dr, t+ dt) = V − γV dt+ Vtdt+ Vrdr + 1
2
Vrrdr · dr
= V − γV dt+ Vtdt+ Vr[α(p− r)dt+ σ
√
rdW ]
+
σ2
2
rVrrdt.
When passing this through the expectation sign, drift term VrσdW van-
ishes since Wiener process has mean zero. Plugging this back into (5.7) and
we have:
V (r, t) = max
p
[
F (r, p) + V − γV + Vt + α(p− r)Vr + σ
2
2
rVrr
]
dt. (5.8)
Cancel out the term V (r, t) on both sides of the equation, and drop dt, we
reach the Bellman equation:
max
p
F (r, p)− γV + Vt + α(p− r)Vr + σ
2
2
rVrr = 0. (5.9)
Similar to previous literature, our interests is not in calculating the value
function in its full form. Instead, we want to answer the following question:
when time horizon is long enough, will the optimal price process converge to
a steady state? In other words, would a fixed price be sufficient in the long
run? The following theorem answers this question:
Theorem 5.3.1. The Bellman equation (5.9) yields a solution. And when
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time horizon approaches infinity, the optimal price process converges to the
following steady-state price:
p∗S = p
∗
D +
σ2
2a(γ + α) + γη
[
a+ η
α
(
γ
2
− ∆
2
)
+
2a+ η
2
]
(5.10)
where ∆ is a constant given by:
∆ =
√
γ2 + 2α
2a(γ + α) + γη
η + a
and p∗D is the optimal price in the deterministic problem:
p∗D =
(γ + α)(b+ ac) + γηc
2a(γ + α) + γη
.
The proof will be provided in Appendix C.
Here we want to point out p∗D is the same as p
ss
optimal given in [36]. Obviously
when σ = 0, our model reduces to a deterministic one and our solution agrees
with the one in [36]. Furthermore, it is easy to check that the coefficient
associated with σ2 is always positive, regardless of the parameters γ, α, η
and a. Therefore when the stochastic reference price is taken into account,
the optimal price is consistently higher. We want to point out that this
conclusion cannot be made by only looking at economic intuitions, as it is
entirely unclear, without careful analysis, how a stochastic reference price
would change optimal price. Mathematically, one can argue that this has to
do with the convexity of V (r, t) in r. But from (5.9) one can see that even
this is not a sufficient argument because there are two(potentially offsetting)
terms involving p: The linear term αVrp which is clearly non-decreasing in
p as Vr ≥ 0; and the demand rate F (r, p) which can be either increasing
or decreasing in p. Therefore the conclusion here is indeed a bit surprising:
Regardless of the parameters we use in the model, it is always beneficial to
have a slightly higher price to deal with stochastic reference price.
5.4 The Effect of Stochastic Reference Price
In the previous section we characterized the effect that optimal price goes
up once stochastic reference price effect is taken into account. In this section
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we try to get an idea of the magnitude of this effect. in other words we
want to know how big the change in optimal price is, given typical model
parameters. To answer this, we have computed a table of the magnitude of
this effect for various parameters. There are six parameters in total, they are:
α(smoothing factor), γ(discount factor), b(constant coefficient in demand
function), a(coefficient of p in demand function), η(coefficient of r − p in
demand function) and c(per-unit cost). We fix c at 0.2 and b at 1.0. Since a
and η only matter through their magnitude relative to b, we choose different
levels for a/b and η/b. various levels of γ and α are also chosen.
For the results, note that the optimal price in (5.10) is linear in σ2, this
coefficient would naturally become our criteria. Furthermore, it makes sense
to divide this coefficient by p∗D as it measures the relative magnitude of this
effect on the optimal price. This ratio, which we call relative price change,
will be quoted in percentage points, to signify its meaning of “percentage
change in optimal price, per unit of variance σ2’.
Two levels of discount factor γ are used: 0.01 and 0.05, their results are
listed in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, respectively.
η/b = 0.2 η/b = 0.5 η/b = 0.8
α 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5
a/b = 0.2 10% 4% 2% 42% 17% 10% 81% 33% 20%
a/b = 0.5 4% 1% 1% 17% 7% 4% 37% 14% 9%
a/b = 0.8 2% 1% 0% 10% 4% 2% 21% 08% 5%
Table 5.1: Relative price change with discount factor γ = 0.01
η/b = 0.2 η/b = 0.5 η/b = 0.8
α 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5
a/b = 0.2 6% 3% 2% 20% 12% 8% 34% 23% 16%
a/b = 0.5 2% 1% 1% 9% 5% 3% 18% 11% 7%
a/b = 0.8 1% 1% 0% 5% 3% 2% 11% 6% 4%
Table 5.2: Relative price change with discount factor γ = 0.05
A few observations are immediate from these tables. First of all, the
relative change in optimal price can be very significant in many scenarios,
keep in mind that these are “per unit of σ2” figures, so the actual relative
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changes in optimal price are these numbers multiplied by σ2. When η/b is
large, reference price effect becomes the more dominating factor in demand
function, in which case the relative price change understandably becomes
large. On the other hand when a/b is large, relative price change becomes
less significant. Furthermore, relative price change decreases when α gets
larger, or when reference price adjusts to new price faster. This also makes
intuitive sense, because as α gets larger, the merit of having a reference price
model shrinks. In the limiting case reference price adjusts to current price
instantaneously, and there would not be a reference price effect any more.
Finally, relative price change decreases when γ gets larger, or when future
profit is discounted more. This is somewhat less intuitive, however it is
still helpful to think about the limiting case. When γ gets arbitrarily large,
future profit is discounted so much so that essentially we would be dealing
with a single-period problem. In which case the relative price change would
of course become 0 as reference price effect itself would vanish.
5.5 Oligopolistic Competition
The results in the last section can be readily extended to the case of compet-
ing firms. Specifically, assume we have N retailers aiming at the same group
of consumers. Furthermore, assume that they have production costs that
are identical. Note that when there is only a single firm, setting price p is
equivalent to setting production quantity q. When there are multiple firms,
this is no longer the case. Price p is now determined by the total production
quantity Q of all the firms through the demand function. That is, Q =
∑
n
qn,
and Q = a− δp− γ(p− r).
Let Vn(r) be the value-to-go function for firm n, the Bellman equation in
this case can be written as:
αVn(r) = max
qn
{
(p− c)qn + dVn(r)
dr
β(p− r) + σ
2r
2
d2Vn(r)
dr2
}
. (5.11)
The maximum is attained by:
qˆn = a+ γr − Qˆ− (δ + γ)c− βdVn(r)
dr
.
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Where Qˆ =
∑
n
qˆn. The firms are identical, and that allows us to sum all the
equations and use V (r) =
∑
n
Vn(r). The PDE we obtain is:
αV =
N
(δ + γ)(N + 1)2
[a+γr−(δ+γ)c+βVr] ·
[
a+ γr − (δ + γ)c− β
N
Vr
]
+
βVr
(δ + γ)(N + 1)
· [a+(δ+γ)Nc+βVr− (δ+γ)(N +1)r+γr]+ Nσ
2r
2
Vrr.
(5.12)
The solution of (5.12) is given by:
V (r) = Ar2 +Br + C
where A is the same as in Fibich et al. [36]:
A = (α + 2β)
(δ + γ)(N + 1)2
8β2N
− γ
2β
pi
√(
(α + 2β)
(δ + γ)(N + 1)2
8β2N
− γ
2β
)2
− γ
2
4β2
.
And B is given by:
B =
(
2[a− (δ + γ)c][Aβ(N − 1) +Nγ] + 2Aβ[a+ (δ + γ)NC](N + 1)
+NA(δ + γ)(N + 1)2σ2
)
/
(
(δ + γ)(N + 1)2(α + β)− 2βN(2Aβ + γ)).
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies a dynamic pricing problem under stochastic reference
price effect. This stochasticity is adopted because it is more reasonable to
assume that the dynamics of reference price is subject to noise. A stochastic
differential equation for the reference price evolution was proposed. The
corresponding optimal pricing model was analyzed using stochastic optimal
control theory. By solving the HJB equations we were able to provide an
explicit solution for the optimal steady-state price.
We then compared numerically our optimal price to the one in [36] to show
that the relative change in the optimal price can be very significant when a
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stochastic reference price is assumed. Specifically, this relative change in
price becomes larger if: (1) reference price effect itself becomes larger, (2)
reference price adapts to new price at a higher speed, and (3) future profit
is discounted more.
One interesting observation is that when noise is introduced in reference
price, the resulting optimal price is always higher, regardless of model pa-
rameters. The managerial implication of this fact is clear: if a decision maker
is adopting a reference price model to set his optimal price, and if he believes
that the noisy dynamics of reference price is causing his model-implied opti-
mal price to become suboptimal, then it is always beneficial for him to adjust
his price upwards.
As a potential direction of extention, it would be interesting to see an
analysis of the oligopolistic competition model with non-identical retailers.
The technique presented in this thesis would no longer work as the Bellman
equation becomes a system of equations.
It is important to point out that while reference price in our model is
subject to noise, the consumer group is still homogeneous in the sense that
they share the same parameters a, η, α, σ, etc. As a potential future direction
of research, it would be interesting to look at a model that analyzes the
heterogeneity of consumer groups explicitly. The meaning of heterogeneity
is two folds here: consumers may differ in their reaction to a given reference
price and a price, in other words they may have different utility functions.
On the other hand, consumers may differ in their underlying reference price
dynamics. We believe that a model that incorporates heterogeneity might
lead to some interesting insights.
In the first case the interesting question is, given a demographic profile of
consumers’ utility functions, what would the aggregate-level demand func-
tion look like? Indeed, this question has already been raised in the literature.
Bell and Lattin [5] argues that by simply using a loss-neutral reference price
effect (so that demand has a linear term in r − p) but allowing the coeffi-
cient in front of r− p to be heterogeneous among consumers, the aggregate-
level reference price effect might demonstrate a loss-averse shape. Thus the
commonly-adopted loss-averse reference price effect might, instead of being
implied by consumer loss-aversion via Prospect Theory, simply be a con-
sequence of heterogeneity in consumers. Arora et al. [2] also studied the
reference price effect in which consumers differ in their risk preference. They
88
also managed to derive important implications from this heterogeneity effect
which makes them suggest that in may be worthwhile for a researcher in this
field or a decision maker to develop a demographic profile of the risk prefer-
ences of consumers. In the second case, it would be interesting to look at -
once again - a dynamic programming problem. When price discrimination is
not allowed, a retailer would have to make his pricing decisions taking into
account all his different consumer groups.
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Chapter 6
Future Research
Chapter 2 extended the class of affine response functions and made them
more versatile. There are two natural questions to ask. First, what is the
fundamental structure on the problem that makes these types of extensions
possible? Nemirovski et al. [7] provides an insightful answer to this question:
when the convex hull of the extended uncertainty set is still in some tractable
form, then the overall robust optimization problem is still efficiently solvable.
The question now becomes this: which classes of nonlinear transformation
can be used to form the extended uncertainty set, so that tractability is
retained. The second question - which might be even harder to answer than
the first - is, for which problems are affine decision rules guaranteed to be
optimal? In other words, what kind of problem structure would render an
extended decision rule worthless? To the best of our knowledge, this question
has only been partially answered by Bertsimas et al. [16], which looks a one-
dimensional multi-stage robust formulation, and proves the optimality of
response functions that are affine in terms of disturbances.
There is another question that appears more specific to the EAARC that
we proposed. Namely how to choose an appropriate extended affinely decision
rule. Specifically, for a given constant ρ ≥ 1, can we construct a tractable
EAARC such that
XEAARC ⊆ X0 ⊆ ρXEAARC?
For the joint inventory-and-pricing problem with general concave cost dis-
cussed in chapter 3, Some further questions that can be asked include: what
happens when inventory replenishments have (deterministic or stochastic)
lead time? What happens with a lost-sales model instead of a backlogging
model? These questions - we believe - would further add a significant chal-
lenge in terms of technical difficulty.
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For the joint inventory-and-pricing problem with reference price effects
studied in chapter 4, there are two interesting unanswered questions. Firstly,
we proved that a base-stock policy is optimal for the model, but what about a
list-price policy? Namely is the optimal price a decreasing function of current
reference price level? Secondly, it will be interesting to see whether our
convergence results would still hold under multiplicative demand uncertainty.
Currently we still don’t know the answer to that this question, although
numerical results show that this is very likely the case.
Finally, chapter 5 represents only an initial attempt to use a more realistic
reference price model that incorporates heterogeneity and randomness. The
interesting question to ask is, among previous results for dynamic pricing
models under reference price effect, which ones will cease to hold under these
more realistic models? Which ones will be preserved under these models?
We believe the answer to this question is greatly valuable to offering more
reliable managerial insights for practitioners who are dealing with reference
price effect.
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Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.2.1 on page 42
To prove Lemma 3.2.1, we need the following result.
Proposition A.1.1. Let α(·) be a concave function in a bounded interval
D = [d, d¯] and β(·) be a continuous function. There exists a d(y) maximizing
α(d) + β(y − d) for d ∈ D such that y − d(y) is an increasing function of y.
To prove the above result, one can first replace d by a new variable d˜ =
y − d. Since α(·) is concave and β(·) is a function of a single variable, the
function α(y − d˜) + β(d˜) is supermodular in (y, d˜). Thus, there exists a d˜(y)
maximizing α(y− d˜) + β(d˜) such that d˜(y) is increasing in y (note that d˜(y)
can be chosen as either the largest optimal solution for all y or the smallest
optimal solution for all y). Then the above lemma holds for d(y) = y− d˜(y).
Now we move on to prove Lemma 3.2.1. Define d(y) = min{d : d ∈
arg maxd∈D[α(d) + β(y − d)]}. By Proposition A.1.1, y − d(y) is increasing.
Define
y0 = sup{y : Γ(y) is non-decreasing on (−∞, y]}.
We claim that d(y0) ∈ {argmaxd∈D α(d)}. In the sequel, we will first prove
the lemma under this claim. The proof for the claim itself will be provided
after that.
Note that if Γ(·) is indeed quasi-K-concave, y0 defined above would be its
largest changeover point. Therefore, to prove the lemma, it is sufficient to
show that Γ(y) is non-K-increasing for y ≥ y0 or for y0 ≤ y2 ≤ y1:
Γ(y2) ≥ Γ(y1)−K.
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Let ξ0 > 0 be the largest changeover of β(y). One should note that, if
ξ0 = ∞, then y0 = ∞ and the lemma is clearly true. So in the following
proof, ξ0 is assumed to be finite.
We first show the right-continuity of y − d(y) at y = y0. Since y − d(y) is
increasing in y, limy→y+0 y−d(y) always exists (superscript “+” means taking
the right limit) and it is sufficient to show that it equals y0 − d(y0). Assume
limy→y+0 y − d(y) = y0 − d˜ for some d˜ ≥ 0. Then by continuity of Γ(·),
Γ(y0) = α(d˜) + β(y0 − d˜)
and so d˜ ∈ {argmaxd[α(d)+β(y0−d)]}. Furthermore, by the monotonicity
of y−d(y) we have y0− d˜ = limy→y+0 y−d(y) ≥ y0−d(y0). Hence, d˜ ≤ d(y0).
As d(y0) is assumed to be the smallest maximizer of [α(d) + β(y0 − d)],
d˜ = d(y0) and limy→y+0 y − d(y) = y0 − d(y0).
We next show by contradiction that y0− d(y0) ≥ ξ0. Suppose y0− d(y0) <
ξ0, by right-continuity of y−d(y) at y0 there exists a number η > 0 such that
for any y ≤ y′ in the interval[y0, y0+η], y0−d(y0) ≤ y−d(y) ≤ y′−d(y′) ≤ ξ0.
We can show that Γ(y) is non-decreasing in this interval [y0, y0+η] with η > 0:
Γ(y′) = α(d(y′)) + β(y′ − d(y′))
≥ α(d(y)) + β(y′ − d(y))
≥ α(d(y)) + β(y − d(y))
= Γ(y),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that d(y′) is optimal for
Γ(y′); the second inequality holds because β(·) is increasing on (−∞, ξ0].
This contradicts with the definition of y0. Therefore, y0 − d(y0) ≥ ξ0.
Now we focus our attention on ξ0 ≤ y2 − d(y2) ≤ y1 − d(y1), we verify the
lemma by discussing several different cases.
If d(y2) ≥ d(y1), then y2 − d(y1) ≥ y2 − d(y2) ≥ ξ0 and therefore
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Γ(y2) = α(d(y2)) + β(y2 − d(y2))
≥ α(d(y1)) + β(y2 − d(y1))
≥ α(d(y1)) + β(y1 − d(y1))−K
= Γ(y1)−K,
where the first inequality follows from the optimality of d(y2) and the
second one from the non-K-increasing of β(y) for y ≥ ξ0.
If d(y2) < d(y1), then we have the following two different cases:
Case I: d(y0) ≥ d(y2). In this case, obviously y2 − d(y0) ≤ y2 − d(y2).
Γ(y2) = α(d(y2)) + β(y2 − d(y2))
≥ α(d(y0)) + β(y2 − d(y0))
≥ α(d(y0)) + β(y1 − d(y1))−K
≥ α(d(y1)) + β(y1 − d(y1))−K
= Γ(y1)−K,
where the second inequality follows from ξ0 ≤ y0 − d(y0) ≤ y2 − d(y0) ≤
y2− d(y2) ≤ y1− d(y1) and the last one from the optimality of d(y0) for α(d)
that we claimed.
Case II: d(y2) > d(y0).
Γ(y2) = α(d(y2)) + β(y2 − d(y2))
≥ α(d(y2)) + β(y1 − d(y1))−K
≥ α(d(y1)) + β(y1 − d(y1))−K
= Γ(y1)−K,
where the first inequality follows from the non-K-increasing of β(y) and the
second one follows from the concavity of α(d) and that d(y0) is its maximizer.
The above cases cover all possibilities and we have proved the lemma under
the claim that d(y0) is a maximizer of α(d). We now turn to prove the claim
itself. Observe that d(y0) can either lie in the interior of D = [d, d] or on
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its boundary. We distinguish between these two cases. If d(y0) is an interior
point of D, then from the first order optimality condition,
α′(d(y0)) = β′(y0 − d(y0)).
If α′(d(y0)) > 0, then β′(y0 − d(y0)) > 0. Since β(·) is continuously
differentiable, β′(x) > 0 for x in a small neighborhood of y0 − d(y0). As
limy→y+0 d(y) = d(y0), one can show that there exists a small neighborhood U
of y0 such that for any y
′, y ∈ U with y′ > y > y0, β(y′−d(y)) > β(y−d(y)).
Then
Γ(y′) = α(d(y′)) + β(y′ − d(y′))
≥ α(d(y)) + β(y′ − d(y))
> α(d(y)) + β(y − d(y))
= Γ(y).
This contradicts with the definition of y0.
If α′(d(y0)) < 0, then β′(y0− d(y0)) < 0. There exists some y′ < y0 that is
sufficiently close to y0 such that β(y
′ − d(y0)) > β(y0 − d(y0)). Then
Γ(y′) = α(d(y′)) + β(y′ − d(y′))
≥ α(d(y0))) + β(y′ − d(y0))
> α(d(y0)) + β(y0 − d(y0))
= Γ(y0),
which also contradicts with the definition of y0. Therefore, α
′(d(y0)) = 0
and d(y0) is an interior maximizer for α(·).
We next consider the case where d(y0) is on the boundary of D. Consider
first d(y0) = d. From the first order optimality condition, we have that
α′(d)− β′(y0 − d) ≤ 0.
We need to show that d is a maximizer of α(d) in D. Suppose this is
not true, then as α(d) is differentiable and concave, α′(d) > 0 and therefore
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β′(y0 − d) > 0. By an argument similar to the one used in the previous two
paragraphs, we can show that for y′ ≥ y > y0 with y′ sufficiently close to y0,
Γ(y′) = α(d(y′)) + β(y′ − d(y′))
≥ α(d(y)) + β(y′ − d(y))
≥ α(d(y)) + β(y − d(y))
= Γ(y),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that β′(y0− d) > 0 and the
continuity of β(·). This contradicts with the definition of Γ(y0). Therefore, d
is a maximizer of α(d). The case that d(y0) = d can be similarly proven. Thus
we have proved our claim that d(y0) ∈ {arg mind∈D α(d)}. This concludes
the proof of Lemma 3.2.1.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2.2 on page 43
Since part (b) has been implicitly proven and used in Chen and Simchi-Levi
[26], we focus on part (a).
Let d(y) ∈ arg maxd∈D[α(d) + β(y− d)] (its existence is guaranteed by the
continuity of α(·) and β(·)) and d∗ be a maximizer of α(·) in D. First note
that if β(·) does not have a finite maximizer, then it must be monotone. In
this case, we can show that Γ(·) is also monotone. We only prove the case in
which β(·) is increasing (the case in which β(·) is decreasing can be proven
similarly). Let y1 ≤ y2. Then
Γ(y1) = α(d(y1)) + β(y1 − d(y1)) ≤ α(d(y1)) + β(y2 − d(y1))
≤ α(d(y2)) + β(y2 − d(y2)) = Γ(y2),
where the first inequality holds since β(·) is increasing and the remaining
equalities and inequality follow from the definition of d(y).
We now assume that β(·) has a finite maximizer, denoted as x∗. It is not
hard to show that y∗ = x∗ + d∗ is a maximizer of the function Γ(·). We
can show that Γ(·) is increasing in (−∞, y∗] and decreasing in [y∗,∞). Let
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y < y∗ and η = y∗ − y. To this end, we prove that Γ(·) is increasing in a
neighborhood of y. Since y < y∗, either d∗ − d(y) or y∗ − d∗ − (y − d(y))
must be no less than η/2. We focus on the case with d∗ − d(y) ≥ η/2 (Note
that the other case is symmetric). In this case, for any y′ ∈ [y, y + η/2], let
d = d(y) + y′ − y. Then d(y) ≤ d ≤ d∗, y′ − d = y − d(y), and therefore
Γ(y) = α(d(y)) + β(y − d(y)) ≤ α(d) + β(y′ − d) ≤ Γ(y′),
where the first inequality holds since α(d) is increasing for d ≤ d∗. We next
prove that Γ(y′) ≤ Γ(y) for any y′ ∈ [y−η/2, y]. For a given y′ ∈ [y−η/2, y],
if y′ − d(y′) ≤ y∗ − d∗, then
Γ(y′) = α(d(y′)) + β(y′ − d(y′)) ≤ α(d(y′)) + β(y − d(y′)) ≤ Γ(y),
where the first inequality holds since β(·) is increasing in (−∞, y∗− d∗]; if
y′−d(y′) ≥ y∗−d∗, denoting d = d(y′)+(y−y′), we have that d(y′) ≤ d ≤ d∗,
y − d = y′ − d(y′) and
Γ(y′) = α(d(y′)) + β(y′ − d(y′)) ≤ α(d) + β(y − d) ≤ Γ(y),
where the first inequality holds since α(d) is increasing for d ≤ d∗. Thus,
Γ(·) is increasing in (−∞, y∗]. Similarly, we can prove that Γ(·) is decreasing
in [y∗,∞).
97
Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 4
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.2.1 on page 56
Proof. Rt(p, r;λ) is a quadratic function in (p, r). By choosing the appro-
priate λt, we want to make its Hessian negative semidefinite and also make
∂2R
∂p∂r
≥ 0. The Hessian of R is:[
−2(at + ηt) + 2γλt−1(1− α)2 ηt + 2γλt−1(1− α)α
ηt + 2γλt−1(1− α)α −2λt + 2γλt−1α2
]
.
Negative semi-definiteness requires the following inequalities:
λt − γλt−1α2 ≥ 0 (B.1)
λt ≤ at + ηt
γ(1− α)2 (B.2)
[−2(at + ηt) + 2γλt−1(1− α)2] [−2λt + 2γλt−1α2]
− [ηt + 2γλt−1(1− α)α]2 ≥ 0. (B.3)
Supermodularity requires
ηt + 2γλt−1(1− α)α ≥ 0. (B.4)
By our assumption in this lemma, demand fluctuates proportionally, there-
fore we can write at and ηt both as multiples of an “underlying demand rate”
ρt: at = aρt and ηt = ηρt. It is therefore not hard to conjecture that the ap-
propriate λt should also be some multiple of the underlying demand rate. In
fact, we looking for λt having the following form: λt = λρt+1. Using this new
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set of notations, and after some simple calculations, equations (B.1)-(B.4)
can be rewritten as:
λ ≤ a+ η
γ(1− α)2 . (B.5)
λρt+1 − γα2λρt ≥ 0. (B.6)
− (a+ η)λρtρt+1 + γα2(a+ η)λρ2t + γ(1− α)2λ2ρtρt+1
+ η2ρ2t/4 + γα(1− α)ηλρ2t ≤ 0. (B.7)
λ ≥ − η
2γα(1− α) . (B.8)
In (B.7), divide both sides by ρ2t and remember kt = ρt+1/ρt, this inequality
further simplifies into a quadratic inequality in λ:
[
γ(1− α)2kt
]
λ2 − [(a+ η)(kt − γα2)− γα(1− α)η]λ+ η2/4 ≤ 0. (B.9)
We now restrict ourselves in looking for λ ≥ 0. (B.6) now becomes kt ≥
γα2. This is always satisfied because of the lemma assumption kt ≥ γα and
that α < 1. Equation (B.8) also becomes trivial because of the restriction
λ ≥ 0. In summary, we now search for 0 ≤ λ ≤ a+η
γ(1−α)2 satisfying (B.9).
(B.9) is a quadratic inequality. We denote it by Aλ2+Bλ+C ≤ 0 for short.
The first thing to check is whether ∆ = B2 − 4AC ≥ 0. Some calculation
would reveal that
∆ =
[
(a+ η)(kt − γα2)− γα(1− α)η
]2 − γη2(1− α)2kt
= (kt − γα2)
[
kt(a+ η)
2 − γ(αa+ η)2] .
This expression is always nonnegative, because by our assumption kt ≥ γα2
and also kt ≥ γ(αa+η)2(a+η)2 . We now pick λ = argmin(Aλ2 + Bλ + C) = − B2A ,
that is:
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λ =
(a+ η)(kt − γα2)− γα(1− α)η
2γ(1− α)2kt . (B.10)
The only thing left to show is that 0 ≤ λ ≤ a+η
γ(1−α)2 . For the upper bound
part:
λ =
(a+ η)(kt − γα2)− γα(1− α)η
2γ(1− α)2kt
≤ (a+ η)kt
2γ(1− α)2kt
=
a+ η
2γ(1− α)2
≤ a+ η
γ(1− α)2 .
As for the lower bound part:
λ =
(a+ η)(kt − γα2)− γα(1− α)η
2γ(1− α)2kt
≥ (a+ η)(kt − γα
2)− γα(1− α)(a+ η)
2γ(1− α)2kt
=
(kt − γα)(a+ η)
2γkt(1− α)2
≥ 0.
The final inequality holds because of the assumption that kt ≥ γα. The
proof is now complete.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3.5 on page 68
Proof. In Proof of Theorem 4.2.1 we have shown that the function behind
maximization sign in (4.4) is jointly-concave in all its variables. Similarly
the function behind maximization sign in (4.6), which we call F 0(y, p; r), is
also jointly-concave in (y, p, r). Furthermore, if we apply the linear transform
d = b−ap+ η(r− p) and call the new function F˜ 0(y, d; r), then this function
is still jointly-concave in (y, d, r). And therefore the maximizing y0(r) should
be continuous in (r).
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Assumption 4.2.1 assumed an uniform lower bound on the stochastic de-
mand, namely D = dm + a ≥ δ > 0 for any valid expected demand d and
any . By continuity of y0(r), there exists a neighborhood B(r∗) such that
|y0(r)− y0(r′)| ≤ δ for all r, r′ ∈ B(r∗).
Suppose that the system starts at a state (x, r) ∈ S1 and r ∈ B(r∗). We use
the decision y0(r) and p0(r) and denote d0(r) = d[p0(r), r], by Theorem 4.3.2
we know r′ = (1 − α)p0(r) + αr ∈ B(r∗). The new inventory level x′ =
y0(r) − d0(r)a − a ≤ y0(r) − δ ≤ y0(r′) which means in the next period,
the optimal inventory decision would not be blocked by a high x′. Carrying
this argument on in a similar fashion as the proof of fact 2 in Theorem 4.3.3,
we can now claim that (x, r) would remain in S1 under the policy y
0(·) and
p0(·). And finally since φ∗(x, r) ≤ φ0(x, r) for all (x, r), it is indeed optimal
for I∗ to follow the policy y0(·) and p0(·).
The proof of local convergence is now complete.
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Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 5
C.1 Proof of Theorem 5.3.1 on page 83
Substitute in the expression for F (r, p), the first order optimality condition
on p gives:
p =
c
2
+
b+ ηr
2(a+ η)
+
αVr
2(a+ η)
. (C.1)
Plugging this back into the Bellman equation (5.9), we get:
σ2
2
r
∂2V
∂r2
+
∂V
∂t
− γV + α
2
4(a+ η)
(
∂V
∂r
)2
+
[
αc
2
− αr + α(b+ ηr)
2(a+ η)
]
∂V
∂r
− c(b+ ηr)
2
+
(b+ ηr)2
4(a+ η)
+
c2(a+ η)
4
= 0.
Introducing a few new notations, this can be written concisely as:
∂V
∂t
− γV + Ar∂
2V
∂r2
+B
(
∂V
∂r
)2
+ P1(r)
∂V
∂r
+ P2(r) = 0. (C.2)
Where A and B are constants. P1(r), P2(r) are 1st-order and 2nd-order
polynomials in r, respectively. Assume further that:{
P1(r) = p10 + p11r
P2(r) = p20 + p21r + p22
Assume function V (r, t) has the following form:
V (r, t) = Q(t)r2 +R(t)r +M(t). (C.3)
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Then we get the following ordinary differential equation:
dQ
dt
− γQ+ 4BQ2 + 2p11Q+ p22 = 0. (C.4)
dR
dt
− γR + 2AQ+ 4BQR + 2p10Q+ p11R + p21 = 0. (C.5)
dM
dt
− γM +BR2 + p10R + p20 = 0. (C.6)
The terminal condition V (r, T ) = 0 ∀r implies terminal conditions Q(T ) =
R(T ) = M(T ) = 0. Here’s a list of the new notations:
A =
σ2
2
B =
α2
4(a+ η)
p10 =
αc
2
+
αb
2(a+ η)
p11 = −α + αη
2(a+ η)
p20 = −bc
2
+
b2
4(a+ η)
+
c2(a+ η)
4
p21 = −cη
2
+
bη
2(a+ η)
p22 =
η2
4(a+ η)
.
We will start by giving an explicit solution to the ODE (C.4). Rewrite it
as:
dQ
dt
= −4B(Q−Q1)(Q−Q2)
where Q1 < Q2 are the two distinct roots of the equation:
4BQ2 − (γ − 2p11)Q+ p22 = 0.
Namely:
Q1 =
γ − 2p11 −
√
(γ − 2p11)2 − 16Bp22
8B
,
Q2 =
γ − 2p11 +
√
(γ − 2p11)2 − 16Bp22
8B
.
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Therefore:
dQ
(Q−Q1)(Q−Q2) = −4Bdt
dQ
Q1 −Q2
[
1
Q−Q1 −
1
Q−Q2
]
= −4Bdt
ln
Q−Q1
Q−Q2 = −4B(Q1 −Q2)t+ C
Q−Q1
Q−Q2 = D · e
−4B(Q1−Q2)t. (C.7)
Using the terminal condition of Q(T ) = 0, we can determine the constant
multiplier D:
D =
Q1
Q2
e4B(Q1−Q2)T .
Plugging this back to (C.7) we get:
Q(t) =
Q1e
4B(Q1−Q2)T −Q1e4B(Q1−Q2)t
Q1/Q2e4B(Q1−Q2)T − e4B(Q1−Q2)t . (C.8)
Plugging this back into (C.5) and (C.6) it is not hard to solve for R(t) and
M(t), and therefore we can get an explicit solution for V (r, t) using (C.3).
These steps can indeed be carried out. However, since this calculation is
tedious, and we are only interested in the steady-state outcome, for simplic-
ity we omit these steps and claim that we have an explicit V (r, t) that is
sufficiently differentiable on [0,+∞)× [0, T ].
Keep in mind that up till now we have solved our nonlinear second order
partial differential equation (C.2) with terminal condition V (r, T ) = 0. And
by performing the minimization indicated in (5.9) we would be able to solve
for the optimal control p∗(t). We still need to prove that this p∗(t) indeed
solves the stochastic optimal control problem in steady state, with the opti-
mal value function equal to V (r, t). This is known as the verification step.
Various forms of verification theorem exist in the optimal control literature,
for example see Theorem 4.1 in chapter VI of Fleming et al. [37]. The typical
condition for a verification theorem is that the value function V (r, t) satisfies
a “polynomial growth” criteria in terms of its state variable r. That is: there
exist constants D and k, for which |V (r, t)| ≤ D(1 + |r|k). Looking at our
value function (C.3), which is itself a second-order polynomial in r, with t in
a finite interval, the “polynomial growth” criteria is obviously satisfied with
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k = 2 and D sufficiently large. Therefore by the verfication theorem, we have
indeed obtained an optimal control to our problem.
In the sequel, let’s turn our attention to the steady-state outcome. Looking
at (C.8), if we hold t fixed, and let T → ∞, then since Q1 < Q2, we would
have Q(t)→ Q1 , Q. Explicitly, we have:
Q =
γ
2α2
(a+ η) +
2a+ η
2α
− a+ η
2α2
∆
where ∆ is given by:
∆ =
√
γ2 + 2α
2a(γ + α) + γη
η + a
.
Correspondingly, we have:
R =
2p10Q+ p21 + 2AQ
γ − 4BQ− p11
=
[
γ
α
+
σ2(a+ η)
α2
+
c(a+ η)
α
]
γ −∆
γ + ∆
+
[
b+ ca+
σ2(2a+ η)
2α
]
2
b+ ∆
.
Similarly we would be able to solve for M , however the explicit formula for
M is not needed in the following analysis. With Q, R, M , the steady-state
value function is now solely dependent on r: Qr2 + Rr + M . To solve for
the optimal steady-state price p∗, we look back to the first-order optimality
condition (C.1). Note that in a steady-state, Vr(r
∗) = 2Qr∗ + R and also
r∗ = p∗. This leads to:
p∗
[
1− η
2(a+ η)
− αQ
a+ η
]
=
c
2
+
b
2(a+ η)
+
αR
2(a+ η)
.
Therefore,
p∗S = p
∗
D +
σ2
2a(γ + α) + γη
[
a+ η
α
(
γ
2
− ∆
2
)
+
2a+ η
2
]
.
Where p∗D is the optimal price in the deterministic problem:
p∗D =
(γ + α)(b+ ac) + γηc
2a(γ + α) + γη
.
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